Protecting Socio-Economic Rights Through the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights by Palmer, E
www.erasmuslawreview.nl Erasmus Law Review, Volume 02, Issue 04 (2009)
©ELLIE PALMER 
PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
THROUGH THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS*
Ellie Palmer**
Abstract
This article is concerned with jurisprudential trends and developments in the protection of 
socio-economic rights through the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).1 It focuses on the potential to gain access to healthcare and welfare services, and the 
fi nancial means to acquire them, through the development of positive obligations in ECHR 
rights.2 It demonstrates that, under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, there has been progress towards a 
principled jurisprudence of positive obligations to provide for the basic human needs of vulnerable 
dependent individuals in a range of contexts, although the limits of state responsibility remain 
fl uid and contested. Secondly, it argues that, in the light of differences between national policies 
and administrative procedures for the fair distribution of public resources, the incremental 
approach to the protection of socio-economic rights through the interpretation of Articles 6 and 
14 ECHR remains problematic. Nevertheless, it is suggested that recent developments in Article 
14 jurisprudence, particularly as demonstrated in the case of D.H. v. Czech Republic,3 signal a 
* A shorter version of this paper was fi rst presented at an expert INTERIGHTS seminar, ‘Strategies for 
the protection of socio-economic rights in Europe’, in March 2009. I am grateful to Iain Byrne and the 
participants for sharing their experiences of litigation in this dynamic area of human rights. The thesis 
presented in this paper draws on analysis of key cases in E. Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights 
and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart 2007) 49-86.
**  Ellie Palmer is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law and member of the Human Rights Centre at the 
University of Essex.
1 Coinciding with the ICJ Report, Courts and the Enforcement of Economic Social and Cultural Rights: 
Comparative Experiences of Justiciability (Geneva: ICJ 2008) (hereinafter, ‘the ICJ Report’) there has been 
a fl owering of international and comparative research on the nature and justiciability of socio-economic 
rights and on jurisprudential techniques to protect them at international regional and domestic level.
 See M. Langford (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (Cambridge: CUP 2008); M. Tushnet, Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008); S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: 
Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: OUP 2008); D. Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights 
(Oxford: OUP 2007); E. Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act 
(Oxford: Hart 2007); D. Barak-Erez and A.M. Gross (eds.), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and 
Practice (Oxford: Hart 2007); F. Coomans (ed.), Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights: Experiences from 
Domestic Systems (Antwerp: Intersentia 2006); J. Vande Lannotte, J. Sarkin, T. De Pelsmaeker and P. Van 
Der Auweraert (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Appraisal of Current International and 
European Developments (Antwerp: Maklu 2002).
 A small number of authors, expressing different degrees of optimism and different comparative 
perspectives, have analysed the potential to protect socio-economic rights through the ECHR. See L. 
Clements and A Simmons, ‘European Court of Human Rights: Sympathetic Unease’, in M Langford (ed.), 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: CUP 
2008); C. O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2008) European Human Rights Law Review 583; E. Brems, ‘Indirect Protection of Social 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’, in D. Barak-Erez and A.M. Gross (eds.), Exploring Social 
Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford: Hart 2007) 135; O. De Shutter, ‘The Protection of Social 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’, in J. Vande Lannotte, J. Sarkin, T. De Pelsmaeker and P. 
Van Der Auweraert (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Appraisal of Current International 
and European Developments (Antwerp: Maklu 2002) 207-239.
2 For a general review of the development of positive obligations under the ECHR, see A. Mowbray, The 
Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European 
Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 2004).
3 Application No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007.
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shift from a narrow formalistic approach to dealing with issues of discrimination to one that may 
be more capable of addressing systemic inequalities in the distribution of social provisions to 
vulnerable individuals and marginalised groups.
1 Introduction
It is well known that, with the exception of the First Protocol,4 the ECHR focuses almost 
entirely on the traditional canon of civil and political rights. At fi rst sight, it has little to 
say about the protection of other great freedoms from want and squalor or the promotion 
of ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’, as aspired to in the 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Nevertheless, as long 
ago as Airey v. Ireland,5 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognised 
that there is an overlap in the ECHR between civil and political rights, on the one 
hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other, a view that it has continued to endorse.6 
Thus, although mindful of the limits of its legitimate intervention in national resource 
allocation policy, the Court has continued to lay the foundations for a body of socio-
economic rights jurisprudence through an incremental interpretation of the traditional 
canon of civil and political rights and the development of positive state obligations in 
Articles 2, 3 and 8 and Articles 6 and 14 ECHR.7
 Legal strategies for gaining access to health services, social care, shelter or indeed 
the fi nancial means to acquire them through the interpretation of ECHR rights fall 
into distinct albeit often overlapping categories. In the fi rst category, individuals or 
groups have tested the scope of positive obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR 
to provide basic health and welfare services or fi nancial support for vulnerable or 
destitute individuals living at the margins of human existence without social support.8 
The second approach, in which the vulnerability or deprivation of claimants may not 
be directly at issue, has focused on the indirect protection of socio-economic rights 
through interpretations of the fair-trial right in Article 6 ECHR or the non-discrimination 
provision in Article 14 ECHR. Thus, it is notable that overall the cases explored in this 
article evaluate the potential to protect rights of the kind enshrined in Articles 9 and 11-
14, of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
of 19969 and Article 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),10 that 
are not confi ned to persons who are economically active. Moreover, it is also notable 
4 Articles 1 and 2 of the First Protocol concern, respectively, the right to property and the right to 
education.
5 In Airey v. Ireland, A.32 (1979), (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 305, the Court stated that there is no watertight 
division between socio-economic and civil and political rights and that the fact that ECHR rights have a 
social dimension should not of itself be a barrier to justiciability. The Court decided that although Article 
6(3) only made explicit reference to legal aid in criminal matters, a right to legal aid in civil matters could 
be inferred from the right to a fair trial. Moreover, Ireland had violated that right.
6 Stec v. UK, Admissibility decision, (2005) 41 EHRR SE 18, at para. 52.
7 For a comprehensive review of the development of positive obligations under the ECHR, see A. 
Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by 
the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 2004). For an early discussion of the scope of positive 
obligations expressly mandated by the right to liberty and security in Article 5, see De Wilde, Ooms and 
Versyp v. Belgium, A.12 (1971), (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 388. For positive obligations deemed to arise from 
the text of Article 6 (the right to a fair trial), see Artico v. Italy, A. 37 (1980), (1981) 7 EHRR 52.
8 See O’Cinneide, above note 1, at 583. The author argues that ‘three principal “gateways” exist via Arts 
2, 3 and 8 ECHR through which this protection against destitution can be sought: each “gateway” opens 
up the possibility of establishing a claim under the Convention based directly on the fact that a state of 
destitution exists which poses a threat to life, or forces individuals into degrading living conditions’. See 
also Clements and Simmons, above note 2, at 412. The authors argue that the ECtHR is prepared to examine 
the state’s responsibility – primarily in terms of its obligations under Articles 3 and 8: (a) where gross socio-
economic defi cits are directly or indirectly attributable to state failure; (b) where severe socio-economic 
defi cits are neither directly nor (obviously) indirectly attributable to state failure to provide. 
9 This group of rights to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing and housing (Article 11), 
health (Article 12) and education (Articles 13 and 14) are generally regarded as the ‘social rights’ referred 
to in the title of the ICESCR.
10 Article 27 CRC enshrines the right of every child to a ‘standard of living adequate for the child’s 
physical mental physical and moral and social development.’
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that, although rights to property and education have long been regarded as the only 
substantive socio-economic rights in the ECHR, recent interpretations of Articles 6 and 
14 ECHR have come close to the creation of a substantive right to social security that 
mirrors the right in Article 9 ECHR.11 Thus, the purpose of this article is to examine 
trends, developments and obstacles in relation to the protection of a range of general 
and substantive socio-economic rights (of the kind enshrined in the ICESCR) through 
the ECHR.
 At the heart of the inquiry lie key questions about the limits of an old-fashioned 
instrument, primarily dedicated to the protection of civil and political rights, to impose 
positive obligations on states parties for the protection of human rights in the socio-
economic sphere. It has therefore been useful from time to time to note the advantageous 
drafting of comparable provisions in more modern constitutions that similarly focus on 
the traditional canon of civil and political rights or the approach that has been taken in 
constitutions such as that of South Africa, where measured and dedicated protection 
has been afforded to both types of rights.12 However, rather than focusing on the 
limitations of the ECHR itself, our purpose here has been to evaluate the incremental 
approach of the ECtHR to developing the social dimension of the civil and political 
rights in the ECHR and to consider the potential for a principled approach that would 
allow the ECtHR to guide the normative development of the rights more effectively, 
without encroaching on the political resource allocation terrain of national authorities. 
Moreover although it is conceded that there has been progress towards the development 
of a principled normative framework for the protection of socio-economic rights of poor 
and disadvantaged individuals living at the margins of human existence in the member 
states, it is argued that the ECtHR’s incremental approach to the development of positive 
obligations and its variable use of the malleable margin of appreciation continues to 
undermine progress towards a principled justifi catory model of adjudication for the 
protection of human rights in the socio-economic sphere.
 Thus, in the remainder of Part I, we briefl y outline the ECtHR’s approach to the 
development of positive obligations, highlighting the jurisprudential and constitutional 
diffi culties of identifying common standards for the protection of socio-economic rights 
in 47 member states with very different cultural, political and socio-economic histories. 
Next, in Part II, we demonstrate that, despite the willingness of the ECtHR to accept 
that there is indeed a social dimension to many of the Convention rights, its approach 
to the incremental development of positive obligations has been fl awed by a deep-
seated reluctance to acknowledge the moral and existential overlap between civil and 
political and socio-economic rights, to confront the inadequacy of the negative-positive 
distinction as a basis for determining their justiciability or to defi ne appropriately the 
parameters of its own adjudicative role in shaping the normative content of resource-
intensive rights through the development of values and principles embodied in the 
ECHR.13
 Finally, against this background, reviewing what is now a considerable and growing 
body of case law, we analyse in Parts III and IV the extent to which the Court’s approach 
to the identifi cation of positive obligations continues to undermine the development 
of a principled justifi catory framework for the protection of socio-economic rights 
11 The right to social security in Article 9 is a hybrid right that straddles the boundaries of economic work-
related rights.
12 Rights in the South African Constitution have been formulated in three different ways, each of which 
requires different responses from the courts. See generally D. Brand, ‘Introduction to Socio-economic 
Rights in the South African Constitution’, in D Brand and C. Heyns (eds.), Socio-economic Rights in South 
Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press 2005) 1-56. In respect of the second category of rights, 
which includes the majority of specifi c socio-economic rights (access to adequate housing, healthcare, food 
and water, and social security), the state is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures within 
its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right. By contrast, the third category, 
which has been negatively formulated, prohibits the state from interfering with the enjoyment of other 
rights. For example, in the case of the right to housing in Article 26, the state is directly prohibited from 
evicting people from their homes ‘without an order of the court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances.’ In addition, Article 27 contains a negatively framed right ‘prohibiting the refusal of 
emergency medical treatment.’
13 See Fredman, above note 1, especially Chapter 1.
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in member states. Moreover, before proceeding, it should be noted that, rather than 
cataloguing the potential to protect a list of substantive rights – medical care, education, 
housing or social security – our evaluation has been conceptually organised around the 
two main strategic approaches described above. Thus, whereas the examination of case 
law in Part III concerns the potential to gain access to a range of basic health and welfare 
services through the development of a jurisprudence of positive obligations in Articles 
2, 3 and 8 ECHR, Part IV focuses on the potential to achieve fairness in the distribution 
of public goods through the development of positive obligations in Articles 6 and 14 
ECHR.
1.1  Socio-economic Rights, Positive Obligations and the Role of the ECtHR
The use of parts of the traditional canon of civil and political rights to protect individuals 
against threats to human rights in the socio-economic sphere is not novel. The right to 
life, due process or non-discrimination provisions in domestic bills of rights have been 
widely used, with varying success, to gain access to socio-economic entitlements.14 
Moreover, in the international arena, longstanding arguments that, in contrast to civil 
and political rights, socio-economic rights are non-justiciable (in light of their positive 
orientation and resource-dependent nature) have lost much of their traditional force. 
Thus, it is now generally conceded that, during the Cold War when the international 
normative framework for the protection of human rights was in the process of negotiation 
by the United Nations, ideological perceptions about differences between the two sets 
of rights were allowed to undermine the persuasive logic of their unitary moral and 
existential foundations.15
 Nevertheless, it must also be accepted that the constructs of civil and political 
and socio-economic rights are products of different political philosophies, with 
correspondingly different ideas of the relationship between individual and state and 
the role of the individual as a citizen in society. Whereas civil and political rights are 
creatures of political philosophies that conceive of the state as a potential threat to 
individual liberty,16 socio-economic rights are associated with moral and political theories 
of citizenship and a conception of the state in which welfare protection is regarded 
as a fundamental precursor to the attainment of individual freedom.17 However, it is 
also clear that, despite the polarisation of these ideological constructs since the end of 
World War II, a more holistic conception of social democracy has prevailed in Western 
Europe, whereby governments have accepted international and domestic obligations 
to safeguard traditional democratic freedoms while at the same time ensuring varying 
levels of economic and social provision.
 It is therefore entirely consistent with such a model of social democracy that the right 
to life in Article 2 should be interpreted in accordance with positive state obligations to 
provide resources for a public or private police force that protects individuals against 
the life-threatening intrusions of violent crime, whether committed by state agents or 
third parties. Further, it can easily be accepted that, in order to give practical effect to 
the ECHR rights in the context of police custody or prison detention, where individual 
liberties are most seriously truncated, Articles 2, 3 or 8 ECHR should be interpreted 
in accordance with affi rmative state duties to provide timely healthcare or to take 
preventive measures against threats to life, such as the provision of essential medicines 
or condoms to protect against AIDS, or to provide conditions of human existence that 
are consistent with maintaining the psychological and physical integrity of vulnerable 
claimants. However, beyond those circumstances of dependency and state control, there 
14 For an overview of the indirect protection of socio-economic rights though civil and political rights in 
a range of contexts, see the ICJ Report, above note 1, at 65-73.
15 The preamble of the ICCPR states ‘the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom 
and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may 
enjoy his [or her] civil and political rights as well as his [or her] economic, social and cultural rights.’
16 See generally F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960); and 
C. Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1994).
17 See generally T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Routledge 1959).
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remain diffi cult questions about the extent to which governments should be obliged to 
make basic provision for vulnerable or destitute individuals, irrespective of whether 
social disadvantage or extreme deprivations can be attributed directly or indirectly to 
the conduct of the state.
 Moreover, turning to consider the indirect protection of socio-economic rights 
through the fair trial clause in Article 6 or the non-discrimination provision in Article 
14, here too we fi nd diffi cult questions about the role of the ECtHR in reviewing policies 
and administrative procedures for the fair distribution of socio-economic entitlements in 
47 member states. Not only have states parties developed very different mechanisms for 
determining what constitutes due process in relation to different types of discretionary 
socio-economic entitlements: they have also adopted very different policies for funding 
health or welfare services and housing and applied different eligibility criteria, such as 
age, disability, nationality or other factors, in setting fi nancial limits to social security 
benefi ts.
 Thus, recent challenges founded on Article 6 or 14, taken in conjunction with Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1, have highlighted the extent to which the incremental approach of 
the ECtHR to the interpretation of Convention rights can confl ict with administrative 
procedures or policies for the fair distribution of socio-economic entitlements in 
member states. For example, the recent case of Tfsayo v. UK18 (Article 6) has called 
into question the legitimacy of internal administrative procedures that had hitherto been 
widely accepted in UK courts as constitutionally appropriate for the adjudication of 
appeals against the refusal of social housing or welfare benefi ts. Moreover, the pragmatic 
judgment of the ECtHR in Stec v. UK,19 which concluded that non-contributory social 
security payments are individual possessory entitlements within the meaning of Article 
1 of Protocol No. l, has been particularly diffi cult to reconcile with the traditional 
reticence of UK courts in reviewing the fairness of social security entitlements, on the 
grounds that ‘contributions to the social security fund are hardly distinguishable from 
general taxation’.20
 Article 14 is the repository of the fundamental principle of equality that suffuses the 
Convention in its entirety and which might have been expected, as in other constitutions, 
to play a more prominent role.21 However, there has been longstanding frustration not 
only with the ECtHR’s restricted application of Article 14 but also with the potential 
for national authorities to justify discrimination within the narrow grounds enumerated 
and with the wide margin of appreciation variably deployed by the ECtHR in Article 
14 disputes.22 Moreover, there has been disappointment regarding the formalistic 
approach of the ECtHR to issues of direct discrimination23 and the Court’s failure to 
develop, through Article 14, a more sophisticated model of substantive equality that 
might have the potential to address more effectively the underlying causes of systemic 
disadvantage and discrimination across member states.24 Nevertheless, in the past few 
18 Application No. 60860/00, November 2006.
19 See above at note 6.
20 Lord Hoffman, R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37, at para. 12.
21 The free-standing equality provision under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter spells out that every 
individual has a right to equal benefi t and protection of the law without discrimination and in particular 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. Similarly, Article 26 ICCPR provides that ‘all persons are equal before the law an are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law … and [shall] guarantee to any person 
effective protection against discrimination on [the enumerated grounds] or other status. By comparison, 
Article 14 has been restricted in two ways: the substantive arena in which discrimination or prejudice is 
forbidden has been restricted to the ‘enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention’. 
The grounds upon which discrimination have been forbidden are restricted to sex, race colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, birth or 
‘other status’. See G. Moon, ‘Complying with Its International Human Rights Obligations: The United 
Kingdom and Article 26 ICCPR’ (2003) 3 EHRL Rev 283.
22 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Equality and UK Law: Past Present and Future (2001) Public Law 7.
23 See generally O. Arnardottir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer 2002).
24 There is a rich literature on the contrasting nature of open-textured ‘substantive’ models of equality 
as opposed to ‘formal’ models, which tend to look for rational or reasonable justifi cations for differences 
in treatment between analogously placed persons or situations. See generally N. Bamforth, M. Malik and 
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years, developments in ECHR jurisprudence, as most keenly exemplifi ed in the case of 
D.H. v. Czech Republic,25 have hinted at the potential for progress from a formalistic 
approach based on ostensibly neutral comparisons between the treatment of analogous 
groups to one that is capable of addressing underlying causes that contribute to systemic 
inequalities in the accessibility of social provision.26
 Recognition that positive action may be necessary to ensure that states parties and 
individuals conform to human rights standards embodied in the ECHR may be viewed 
as progress from an individualised system of compensatory justice to an international 
regime that participates more widely in the monitoring and development of international 
human rights standards.27 Nevertheless, for states parties, ‘dynamic’ developments in 
ECHR jurisprudence, which dictate the imposition of positive obligations, may not only 
be diffi cult to square with their understanding of the negative obligations that they had 
undertaken at the time of ratifi cation:28 positive obligations in sensitive areas of policy, 
such as immigration or national security or social provision, may also be in tension with 
dominant values and customs in individual member states and the ECtHR’s duty to 
respect them. To what extent can core principles and values enshrined in ECHR rights 
serve to overcome the problems of national difference in these areas?
 Problematically, the Court has declined to offer a single theory to explain the 
expansion of affi rmative duties in ECHR rights.29 In some cases, the identifi cation of 
positive duties has been tersely explained by reference to an overriding obligation ‘to 
ensure to everyone the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention’30 or to ensure 
that rights guaranteed by the Convention are not merely ‘theoretical and illusory’ 
but ‘practical and effective’.31 In other cases, judicial creativity has been justifi ed by 
reference to the general interpretative obligation to ensure that the ‘the object and 
purpose’ of the Convention are fulfi lled.32
 Moreover, over time, commentators have accepted the increased inference of 
affi rmative duties as a necessary part of the effective protection of ECHR rights33 or as 
a facet of the ‘dynamic interpretation of the Convention, in light of changing social and 
moral assumptions’.34 However, as we shall see further in Part II, there is continuing 
concern about the ECtHR’s failure to provide a principled theory of positive obligations 
by which to defi ne more clearly the limits of state responsibility for the protection of 
ECHR rights, particularly in the area of socio-economic needs.35
C.  O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context – Text and Materials (London: Sweet & Maxwell 
2008). See also S. Fredman, ‘Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide 
Resources’ (2005) 21(2) SA Journal on Human Rights 163 at 167; see also S. Fredman and S. Spencer, 
‘Beyond Discrimination: its Time for Enforceable Duties on Public Bodies to Promote Equality Outcomes’ 
(2006) EHRLR 598-606.
25 See above at note 3.
26 For a recent critique, see R. O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-
Discrimination in the ECHR’ (2009) 29(2) Legal Studies 211.
27 See A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon 1993).
28 The Convention entered into force in 1953 and has been ratifi ed by all forty-seven member states of the 
Council of Europe.
29 See Plattform “Arze fur das Leben” v. Austria, A.139 (1988), (1990) 12 EHRR 1.
30 Article 1 ECHR.
31 Marckx v. Belgium, A.31 (1979), (1979) 2 EHRR 330.
32 The Convention is an international treaty and as such should be interpreted in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which provides in Article 31(1) that ‘A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.’
33 See J.G Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester: MUP 1993) 102.
34 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford: OUP 2002, 2nd ed.).
35 For example, see the criticism of this aspect of the ECtHR jurisprudence by the UK House of Lords in 
N v. UK (2008).
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2 Principle or Pragmatism: Developing Positive Obligations in ECHR 
Rights
2.1 The Negative-Positive Dichotomy Revisited: To ‘Respect, Protect and 
Promote the Rights’?
Since Airey, the ECtHR has developed positive obligations across the full range of 
Convention rights. However, it is well known that the phenomenon can be most fully 
demonstrated in relation to Article 8 ECHR. Thus, in conjunction with expansive 
interpretations of the substantive elements of Article 8 (private and family life, home 
and correspondence), the Strasbourg organs have increasingly allowed the malleable 
notion of ‘respect’ in Article 8(1) to support the development of a wide range of both 
positive and negative obligations in the ECHR.36 Moreover, although at fi rst sight there 
is little to associate the negative formulation of Article 3 with the imposition of positive 
obligations, the ECtHR has concluded during the past decade that states parties may 
be required to undertake a growing range of affi rmative duties in order to be Article 3 
compliant.37
 Furthermore, the imposition of positive duties for the protection of rights in Articles 
2, 3 and 8 ECHR is no longer confi ned to traditional areas of governmental responsibility, 
such as national security, state detention or the administration of justice. It is now a 
commonplace that the ECtHR has indicated a readiness, albeit somewhat fl uctuating, 
to impose positive obligations on states parties in widening areas of governmental 
responsibility, including the protection of the environment, child protection and public 
health and welfare systems.38 Therefore, in some cases, drawing explicitly on core 
values of equality, respect for human dignity and psychological and physical integrity, 
which are increasingly seen as immanent in all ECHR rights, the Court has hinted 
at the potential for a duty to provide public health care under Article 2,39 to ensure 
appropriate medical care or welfare for vulnerable individuals under Article 3 in extreme 
circumstances40 and to ensure access to welfare provision in the form of housing for 
vulnerable applicants under Article 8,41 even in cases where there has been no allegation 
of a direct interference with the right in question.
 Nevertheless, it is notable that, in its dynamic development of Convention rights, the 
ECtHR has continued to use the perfunctory language of positive and negative duties 
– an approach that is in direct contrast to the modern tripartite analysis that identifi es 
a cluster of correlative obligations ‘to protect, respect and fulfi l’ inherent in all human 
rights, whether civil and political or socio-economic.42 As we have seen in the ICJ 
Report, this prescriptive and functional model, when applied in the international human 
rights discourse and in modern constitutional drafting, not only addresses the conceptual 
weaknesses of the positive-negative classifi cation of rights but also recognises that 
particular problems of adjudication and enforcement arise in cases where human 
rights compliance necessitates the imposition of long-term fi nancial obligations on 
governments, whatever the category of the right.
 However, as amply demonstrated by Alistair Mowbray, although couched in the 
language of negative-positive rights, over time the ECtHR has in practice identifi ed a 
range of procedural and substantive obligations that correspond exactly to those found 
36 See C. Warbrick, ‘The Structure of Article 8’ (1998) EHRL Rev 32-44.
37 See Mowbray, above note 2, 42-65.
38 See D. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford: OUP 2009) 18-21.
39 See LCB v. United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 212; Cyprus v. Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 71. 
40 D v. United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423; O’Rourke v. United Kingdom, Application No. 39022/97, 
26 June 2001 (unreported).
41 Marzari v. Italy (1999) 28 EHRR CD 175.
42 See the ICJ Report, above note *, at 42-54 for the use of tripartite classifi cation (to respect, protect and 
fulfi l) in breaking down barriers to the justiciability of socio-economic rights.
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in Henry Shue’s elaborate taxonomy43 – not least the duty to avoid depriving a person 
of his or her basic rights (the duty to respect) or the duty to take procedural steps to 
promote (facilitate) rights.44 Therefore, when we examine the full range of positive 
obligations across the ECHR rights, although not articulated by the ECtHR, we fi nd that 
the implication of affi rmative duties has been consistent with the recognition that threats 
to all human rights require a range of protective and preventive measures that take into 
account the context in which the violation occurs, the seriousness of the threat and the 
immediacy of the action necessary to fulfi l or facilitate the protection of the right. Thus, 
among those commentators who have recently posited a more principled lens in Articles 
3 and 8 ECHR through which issues of state responsibility for extreme socio-economic 
defi cits can be examined, Clements and Simmons have suggested that, when analysing 
the impact of the Convention, it is no longer helpful to follow the two broad categories 
‘state action denied’ and ‘state action demanded’. Rather, it is suggested that, although 
still artifi cial, a better approach is to analyse according to context: to ‘what degree it can 
be said that the State [itself] is culpable and just how severe is the destitution in issue?’45
2.2 State responsibilities, resources and the variable margin of appreciation
Not only has the ECtHR’s immersion in the language of negative-positive rights 
impeded the development of a more sophisticated normative framework that applies 
to both sets of rights,46 but the well-known fallacy that positive obligations (in contrast 
to negative duties to refrain) invariably impose inappropriate fi nancial burdens on 
states parties has further contributed to a defensive and fragmented approach to the 
interpretation of positive obligations and a reluctance by the ECtHR to determine the 
liability of states parties for breach.47 Moreover, until recently, academic critiques have 
also focused on issues of constitutional propriety rather than on the Court’s failure to 
develop a coherent principled approach to the development of positive obligations for 
the effective protection of ECHR rights in member states.
 Thus, while recognising that the principle of effectiveness justifi es the inference 
of a limited range of affi rmative duties in ECHR rights, in one of the earliest critiques 
of their expansion, in a passage that echoes traditional objections to the inference of 
positive duties in the US Constitution,48 Professor Merrills argued that the negative 
orientation of the Convention rights should, except in a small number of cases, inhibit 
the expansion of positive obligations by the ECtHR. Therefore, in questioning what he 
saw as the incautious expansion of positive obligations in the ECHR rights, Professor 
Merrills pointed in particular to the dangers of their expansion in the areas of social 
and economic policy. Although agreeing that governments that have signed the ECHR 
may have understood that policies would have to be modifi ed in some areas, he argued 
that ‘what a government may not bargain for, is to fi nd itself put to considerable trouble 
and expense … as a result of an obligation to advance particular social or economic 
policies which it may not wholly support’.49 Nevertheless, only on rare occasions have 
the ECHR organs adopted an originalist stance on the interpretation of ECHR rights.50 
43 See H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affl uence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 1996, 2nd ed.) ‘Afterword’ (at 155).
44 For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Henry Shue’s taxonomy and the ECHR 
jurisprudence, see A. Mowbray, above note 2, at 221-228.
45 Id., at 412. In a landmark decision, R. (on the application of Limbuela) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, the UK House of Lords concluded that state responsibility is engaged where positive 
state action drives individuals into inhuman and degrading living conditions. For a full discussion of the 
context of the case which concerned the enactment of legislation denying support and the possibility of 
work from destitute asylum seekers, see Palmer, above note 1, at 254-270.
46 See K. Starmer, ‘Positive Obligations Under the Convention’, in Jowell and Cooper (eds.), 
Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart 2001) 139.
47 For examples of negatively framed rights in Articles 26 and 27 of the South African Constitution, see 
above note 12.
48 See DeShaney v. Winebago Social Services Department (1989) 489 US 189.
49 Merrills, above note 33, at 106.
50 Marckx v. Belgium, above note 31.
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Instead, the Court has continually affi rmed its intention to treat the Convention as a 
dynamic living instrument, which must adapt to changing political and social mores in 
member states.51
 It is true that the Convention primarily provides a set of negative restraints on 
government action, which at the time of drafting were aimed at the protection of 
traditional civil and political freedoms. However, it may also be argued that there is 
a very important difference between the nature of the ECHR and the US Constitution. 
Unlike the latter, whose text has often been deemed to be hostile to any form of positive 
state intrusion in the original constitutional settlement, the ECHR is an international 
convention dedicated to the protection of human rights. Thus, under Article 1 ECHR, 
the general obligation on states parties is to ‘secure to everyone in their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defi ned in … the Convention.’ Therefore, despite its primarily 
negative orientation and its embodiment of traditional civil and political liberties, the 
ECtHR has recognised that, in contrast to the US Constitution, rather than primarily 
to ‘safeguard individual freedom from over mighty government’, the purpose of the 
Convention is ‘is to safeguard human dignity, even in the sphere of individuals among 
themselves’.52
 Nevertheless, the Strasbourg organs have continued to emphasise that, in sensitive 
areas of social policy involving complex resource allocation issues, especially those 
involving individual claims for priority in the allocation of health or welfare resources, 
supervision by a supranational court should give way to state discretion in enforcing its 
own laws.53 However, this wide ‘margin of appreciation’ has been deployed variably 
by the ECtHR. On the one hand, it has been used to connote a general principle of 
judicial review, whereby the standard of scrutiny should be moderated in accordance 
with the complexity or sensitivity of the subject matter and the greater potential for 
appropriate adjudication by domestic courts.54 On the other hand, it has also been used 
more generally to defer on constitutional grounds to the propriety of decision making as 
regards resource allocation by the national authorities themselves.55 Thus, in such cases, 
the ECtHR relies on a general interpretative obligation to respect domestic cultural 
traditions and values when determining the meaning and scope of ECHR rights, which 
is a principle of general application in international law.56
 There are divergent views on the effi cacy or constitutional propriety of the margin of 
appreciation deployed in Strasbourg. For constitutionalists who emphasise the need to 
respect the diversity of values and different democratic traditions in member states, the 
margin of appreciation is applauded. However, for those who approve the development 
of the Court’s constitutional role in promoting common values and standards of respect 
for human dignity in a growing family of European democratic states, the use of the 
51 Tyrer v. UK, A.26 (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1. For a recent overview of the ‘dynamic or evolutive’ 
interpretation of the ECHR, see Harris, O’ Boyle and Warbrick, above note 38, at 7-8.
52 X v. Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235. See Starmer, above note 46, at 203.
53 For a recent discussion of the concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ deployed by the ECtHR, see 
Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, above note 38, at 11-14.
54 See Sentges v. Netherlands, Application No. 27677/02, Judgment of 18 July 2003, where the ECtHR 
starkly reaffi rmed this principle. Finding the applicant’s claim to be ‘manifestly unfounded’, the ECtHR 
stated that ‘… regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests 
of the individual and of the community as a whole and to the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by States 
in this respect in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention… This margin 
of appreciation is even wider when, as in the present case, the issues involve an assessment of the priorities 
in the context of the allocation of limited State resources…’.
55 See, for example, Handyside (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 737, at paras. 48-51; See also Evans v. UK (2007) 
46 EHRR 7287, at para. 77G: It will also be wide where there is no consensus among the members of the 
Council of Europe either as to the relative importance of interests at stake or the best means of protecting 
it, especially where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues. Compare the use of the concept to limit 
the adjudication of positive rights in Chapman v. UK. See the ECtHR comment in Chapman v UK, in text 
relating to footnote 124. 
56 See generally Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, above note 38, at 13-14. On the principle of subsidiarity 
in the Convention, see R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) at 76.
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doctrine to restrict the standard of review may refl ect an abnegation of the Court’s 
primary duty to determine the proportionality of state conduct in relation to the rights 
protected by the Convention.57
2.3 Methodological Issues: Imposing a Principled Jurisprudence of Positive 
Obligations on the Negative Convention Framework
It is well known that the Convention framework discloses a dual purpose. In upholding 
the principle of democracy, it seeks to balance the rights of the individual in society 
against other public interests. At the same time, in accordance with the rule of law (see 
the Preamble), it seeks to ensure that the ‘tyranny of the majority’ is not allowed to 
interfere disproportionately with the rights of minorities in member states.
 Thus, consistent with this duality of purpose, the Strasbourg organs have not only 
recognised the principle that ‘inherent in the framework of the Convention is a search 
for a fair balance between the demands of the whole community and the protection 
of fundamental rights’,58 but have also sought to ensure that limitations imposed on 
individual rights are imposed only if they are ‘prescribed by law, intended to achieve 
a legitimate objective and necessary in a democratic society’. Therefore, suffusing the 
Convention in its entirety is the concept of proportionality, which requires a judicial 
evaluation of whether state interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In 
practice, moreover, this requires that ‘restrictions on rights’ must be justifi ed by ‘a 
legitimate aim’ and one that is ‘proportional to the need at hand’, further interpreted in 
the case law as meaning a ‘pressing social need’.59
 In addition to general principles for determining the legitimacy of the interference, 
in the case of some rights, specifi c limits have been implied or, as in Articles 8-10, 
expressly provided in the articles themselves. Thus, for example, Article 8(2) provides 
that
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Therefore, in complaints founded on allegations of negative intrusion, a sophisticated 
jurisprudential method has evolved, whereby, once it has been demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of the Court that a complaint falls within the ambit of a particular Convention 
right, limitations and restrictions of the kind included in Articles 8-11 ECHR are applied 
in order to determine whether there has been a substantive violation.60
 Thus, typically, in Article 861 claims founded on allegations of state interference, 
the Court decides fi rst whether the right in Article 8(1) encompasses a specifi c duty, for 
example to involve natural parents in the decision-making process when children have 
been removed into care,62 then whether there has been an interference with that right, 
before seeking a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and 
the community, as required by the defensive precepts in Article 8(2). Thereafter, once 
a duty has been recognised as falling within the scope of the right in Article 8(1), the 
57 For a critique of the doctrine, see P. Mahoney, ‘Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural 
Relativism’ (1998) 19 Human Rights Law Journal 1, where he compares the roles of the ECtHR and the US 
Supreme Court. See also K.A. Kavenaugh ‘Policing the margins: rights protection and the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2006)  4 EHRLR 422.
58 Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, at para. 89.
59 Handyside v. United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, at para. 48.
60 This format and wording is closely followed in Articles 9-11, although the restrictions, some of which 
are tailored to the rights, are different. For example, only Article 8(2) refers to the economic well-being of 
the country.
61 Article 8 reads as follows: ‘(i) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country…’.
62 See, for example, Johansen v. Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 33.
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state, as duty bearer, is required by Article 8(2) to show that any interference with the 
complainant’s right is ‘in accordance with the law … necessary in a democratic society 
… in the interests of … the economic well-being of the country … or for the protection 
of rights and freedom of others.’63
 By this methodology, complainants have the benefi t of the rigorous inquiry afforded 
by Article 8(2), which fi nally seeks to determine whether the measure impugned 
is necessary in a democratic society. For example, in cases where negative duties 
encompassed by Article 8 give rise to state expenditure,64 Article 8(2) affords an internal 
mechanism of appreciation by which the Court must seek to balance the economic 
interests of the whole community and the rights and interests of others with those of the 
individual complainant. Moreover, despite the wide margin that the Strasbourg organs 
have notionally allowed to states parties in matters of resource allocation, in the case 
of Lopez Ostra,65 which concerned the state’s failure to protect the applicant against 
harm caused by toxic omissions from a privately owned chemical plant, it was fi rmly 
concluded that, in this exercise of appreciation under Article 8(2), a mere incantation of 
scarce resources will not be enough.66
 However, commentators have suggested that a difference in the treatment of claims, 
for example under Article 8, can be found in practice, depending on whether they have 
been framed as allegations of negative or positive breaches of state duties.67 This is 
because, it is argued, in complaints framed as positive breaches of duty (failure to protect 
the right), it is all too easy for the question of breach to be confl ated with the logically 
prior question of the scope of the duty encompassed by Article 8(1).68 It has therefore 
been argued that, in complaints framed as positive breaches of duty, both parties may 
lose the benefi t of the complex balancing exercise that has traditionally followed the 
preliminary inquiry and which has marked the evolution of the ECHR as a sophisticated 
mechanism of differential rights adjudication.
 Nevertheless, in Powell and Rayner v. UK,69 anxious to dispel such concerns, the 
ECtHR was clear that whether the case was presented in terms of a positive state duty to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants rights under Article 
8(1) or in terms of ‘an interference’ by a public authority, the same methodological 
approach should be applied. Moreover, in response to similar concerns relating to 
allegations of breach of the positive aspects of Article 3, in Rees v. UK,70 the ECtHR 
was clear that, despite the absence of an express requirement of proportionate 
interference, the defensive precepts in Article 8(2) are no less appropriate as yardsticks 
for determining the limits of state liability for positive breaches of duty under Article 
3 ECHR. Nevertheless, in its analysis of the same question in Pretty v. UK,71 the Court 
signifi cantly held that
63 Id., at paras. 78-95.
64 For example, the duty not to separate family members may have signifi cant resource implications and 
in some cases give rise to a positive obligation to provide housing.
65 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277.
66 Although the applicant complained of the state’s failure to protect her against a direct violation of her 
rights (positive breach), the Lopez case was cast in terms of negative interference.
67 See C. Warbrick, ‘The Structure of Article 8’ (1998) EHRLR 1, at 32-44.
68 See the remarks of Judge Wildhaber in Stjerna v. Finland (1994) 24 EHRR 194, where it was recognised 
that it was diffi cult to address complaints founded on positive breaches of duty by means of the traditional 
methodological approach to determining whether there has been an intrusive violation of Article 8.
69 A.172 (1990) 12 EHRR 355. The applicants, who lived near Heathrow Airport, complained that 
excessive noise from the airport breached their right under Article 8 to respect for their private life and 
home. Therefore, as a preliminary issue, the government sought to question whether the complaint disclosed 
the necessary ‘interference by a public authority’, because Heathrow Airport and the traffi c using it were 
not owned or controlled by the government or its agents.
70 A.106 (1986), (1987) 9 EHRR 56. The applicant claimed that refusal by the UK government to allow 
her legally to alter her birth certifi cate so as to refl ect her gender reassignment constituted a positive breach 
of her Article 8 right to respect for private life.
71 Application No. 2346/02, ECHR 2002-III, (2002) 35 EHRR 1.
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… while states may be absolutely forbidden to infl ict the proscribed treatment on individuals within their 
jurisdictions, the steps appropriate to discharge a positive obligation may be more judgemental, more prone 
to variation from state to state, more dependent on the opinion and beliefs of the people and less susceptible 
to any universal injunction’.72
Thus, once again (as in the preceding sections of Part II), we fi nd the ECtHR’s reluctance 
to embrace a modern theory of human rights adjudication, which recognises: that issues 
of state liability (especially where resources are implicated) should be determined not by 
the negative or positive designation of the right in question but rather by the immediacy 
and seriousness of the threat, the degree – if any – of state involvement and the extent 
to which resources are implicated in the satisfaction of the right.
 However, it would be misleading to suggest that the ECtHR has been able to ignore 
the reality that positive obligations are an integral aspect of all human rights rather 
than extraneous constructs superimposed on the existing catalogue of so-called negative 
rights. Nor has the ECtHR been immune from a growing trend in judicial review 
whereby constitutional and administrative courts are increasingly expected to shape our 
understanding of what is positively required of governments in protecting fundamental 
human rights.73 Thus, as we turn to examine the potential to protect socio-economic 
rights through the interpretation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, we fi nd that the refl exive 
incremental approach of the ECtHR described in the preceding sections sits uneasily 
beside the emergence of a more principled approach to the development of positive 
obligations, determined in accordance with the universal fundamental standards of 
dignity, equality and personal autonomy inherent in the Convention rights.
3 Developing Core Responsibilities for Socio-Economic Provision: 
Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR
During the past two decades, individuals and groups have increasingly tested the 
extent to which governments and public authorities might be held to account through 
the judicial system for failing to provide access to services such as health treatment, 
education and housing or for failing to prioritise the needs of vulnerable individuals or 
groups in the allocation of scarce resources.74 Moreover, the ECtHR has not escaped 
this trend. Over time it has been required to provide a more coherent response (than 
previously afforded by the Commission) to some of the most challenging and often 
agonising decisions in public law adjudication: those in which the very essence of the 
dispute involves competition by individuals and groups over access to scarce resources, 
in many cases for the purpose of survival. Thus, here, as in other areas, we see the 
gradual transition of the ECtHR from a forum that has predominantly been required 
to give effective protection to rights for individual complainants before it to one that 
must address fundamental questions concerning the limits of state responsibility for the 
health and well-being of individuals in the jurisdiction, irrespective of whether failures 
can be attributed directly or indirectly to the conduct of the state, its agents or third 
parties. Thus, the ECtHR has been faced with questions concerning the boundaries of 
state responsibility for meeting basic human needs such as life-prolonging treatment 
for terminally ill patients, facilities to increase the ability of disabled people to live a 
fulfi lling life in the community or basic provisions for those who have suffered extreme 
socio-economic deprivations or psychological injury as a result of conduct by the state, 
its agents or third parties.
3.1 The Unfulfi lled Promise of Article 2: The Right to Life
As noted in the introduction to this article, recent strategies for the protection of socio-
economic rights through the ECHR have focused on the potential to protect the health 
and welfare rights of vulnerable individuals through Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. However, 
72 Id., at para. 15 (emphasis added).
73 See D. Dyzenhaus, The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart 2004) especially at 2-23.
74 See Langford, above note 1.
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almost two decades ago, academic commentators had optimistically considered the 
possibility, that Article 2 might be developed by the ECtHR to furnish a positive general 
‘social right’, encompassing health treatment, shelter and a healthy environment, of the 
kind developed by the Indian Constitutional Court.75 Alternatively, it was suggested that 
the positive aspect of Article 2 might be fashioned into a right to health treatment of the 
kind enshrined in Article 11 of the European Social Charter.76 Indeed, in Osman v. the 
United Kingdom,77 in its preliminary opinion, the Commission famously speculated on 
the scope of this obligation:
Whether risk to life derives from disease, environmental factors or from the intentional activities of 
those acting outside the law, there will be a range of policy decisions relating inter alia to the use of State 
resources, which it will be for Contracting States to assess on the basis of their aims and priorities, subject 
to these being compatible with the values of democratic societies and the fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the Convention… the extent of the obligation to take preventive steps may increase in relation to the 
immediacy of the risk to life. Where there is a real and imminent risk to life to an identifi ed person or group 
of persons a failure by the State authorities to take appropriate steps may disclose a violation of the right to 
protection of life by law.78
Nevertheless, an examination of the case law shows that during the past two decades, 
in its interpretation of Article 2(1), the Court has not moved far from an orthodox 
conception of ‘life protection’ aimed at protecting individuals against unlawful killings 
in the traditional contexts of national security and policing. Thus, although the Court 
has confi rmed the potential of Article 2 to protect against environmental hazards79 and 
has found an infringement of Article 2 in the prison context, in circumstances where 
failure to protect had not resulted in death,80 only in a small number of cases has the 
protection of Article 2(1) been extended to the public health or welfare arena.81
 Thus, for example, in Nicketi v. Poland,82 where the state system allowed for a 70% 
contribution towards the cost of treating his chronic life-threatening condition, the 
applicant claimed that, since he was unable to afford the remaining 30%, his health 
would deteriorate to the point where lack of treatment would inevitably result in 
untimely death. The ECtHR accepted that the positive obligation under Article 2 could be 
engaged in such cases, but having reviewed the facts, ruled the application inadmissible. 
It therefore stated that ‘bearing in mind the medical treatment and facilities provided … 
75 See generally D. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (London: Butterworths 1995) 41. 
76 As long ago as X v. Ireland (1976) 7 DR 78, the Commission stated that the fact that Article 2(1) 
enjoins the state not only to refrain from taking life intentionally but also to safeguard life encouraged 
expectations. Article 11 ESC states: ‘… The parties undertake either directly or in cooperation with public 
or private organisations to take appropriate measures designed inter alia: (1) to remove as far as possible 
the causes of ill-health; (2) to provide … facilities for the promotion of health and encouragement of 
individual responsibility in the matters of health; (3) to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and 
other diseases, as well as accidents.
77 Application No. 23452/95, Report of the Commission dated 1 July 1997.
78 Id., at 91.
79 In Guerra, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the applicant’s alleged violation of her Article 2 
rights due to the prior fi nding of a breach of the state’s positive obligations under Article 8. Subsequent 
case law has applied the judgment in Guerra. See, for example, Oneryildiz v. Turkey (2004) 39 ECHR  353, 
where the Court acknowledged, in para. 64, that ‘a violation of the right to life can be envisaged in relation 
to environmental issues…’.
80 It is clear from Keenan v. United Kingdom (2002) 33 EHRR 913, at para. 90, that the obligation upon 
prison authorities under Article 2 encompasses the duty to take proportionate and reasonable steps to guard 
against the risk of death and injury suffered in custody and that this ‘obligation is particularly stringent 
where that individual dies.’
81 See, for instance, Cyprus v. Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 731, considered by Mowbray, above note 2, as 
authority for the proposition that Article 2 may be invoked in circumstances when a state ‘fails to meet 
its own declared standard [of healthcare provisions] … in a life threatening case’ and ‘tantalisingly’ as 
suggesting that ‘Article 2 may also require the provision of a minimum level of health by a member State.’ 
While this minimum level will vary from state to state due to the reluctance of judges to second-guess the 
allocation of scarce resources and the divergent economies of many member states, Mowbray does suggest 
that the state’s role will also extend to the regulation of private sector medical treatment providers (Calvelli 
and Ciglio v. Italy, Judgment of 17 January 2002, CEDH 2001-I. See Mowbray, above note 2.
82 Application No. 6563/01, Admissibility decision, 21 March 2001.
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the Respondent State cannot be said in the special circumstances of the present case to 
have failed to discharge its obligations under Article 2 by not paying the remaining 30% 
of the drug price.’83
 Moreover, there is little in the jurisprudence to suggest the willingness of the Court 
to explore different aspects of the fundamental right to life, such as the psychological 
and physical integrity of claimants or the protection of human dignity, as suggested by 
Judges Jambreck and Ward, who formed the minority in Guerra v. Italy.84 Signifi cantly 
however, creative developments of the kind proposed by the minority in Guerra have 
taken root in different quarters. Thus, not only has the Court recognised that a stark 
injunction to protect human dignity, implicit in Article 3 and immanent in all the ECHR 
rights, may require states parties to take positive steps to meet the health and welfare 
needs of vulnerable claimants,85 but it has also been recognised that the right of respect 
for physical and psychological integrity, which lies at the heart of the complex right in 
Article 8 ECHR, may give rise to positive obligations to meet the health and welfare 
needs of claimants suffering from a disability and in need of medical treatment86 or even 
shelter.87 Thus, it is notable that in complaints of failure to protect individual health and 
welfare interests, though recognising that Article 2 is engaged, the Court has preferred 
to decide cases on the basis of Article 3 or 8.
3.2 The Promise of Article 3: Respect for Human Dignity
Violations of Article 3 have increasingly been recognised by the ECtHR in complaints 
of state failure to provide conditions of existence that satisfy the fundamental right of all 
humans to be treated with dignity in relation to their basic needs, including the need for 
shelter.88 Moreover, although a positive duty to meet medical and other welfare needs of 
vulnerable individuals has most frequently been found in the context of prison or police 
custody, it has also been recognised beyond those areas of governmental responsibility 
that a failure to make provision for vulnerable claimants suffering from disabilities may, 
in humanitarian cases of suffi ciently acute need, constitute infringements of Article 3.89
 However, clearly not every type of indignity suffered amounts to degrading 
or inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3. The yardstick is said to be 
‘a minimum level of severity’ which is relative to the duration of the treatment, its 
83 Id., at 5 See also Scialaqua v. Italy, Application No. 34151/96, Admissibility decision, 1 July 1998, 
where the applicant who was diagnosed as requiring a liver transplant was treated privately by alternative 
treatment and unsuccessfully reclaimed the cost of his life-saving medical treatment from the state.
84 In his concurring opinion in Guerra v. Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 359, Judge Jambrek expressed the view 
that ‘protection of health and physical integrity was closely associated with the right to life (at 387).
85 See the discussion of Article 3 below.
86 See, for example, Valentina Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 14462/03, Admissibility 
decision, 4 January 2005. The applicants, who suffered from chronic renal failure, complained about the 
failure of the state to provide comprehensive haemodialysis treatment. The Court acknowledged that the 
Convention does not provide a right to free medical healthcare but was prepared to accept that Article 8 
was applicable to the facts. However it also stressed that the state enjoyed a particularly wide margin of 
appreciation, stating that ‘While it is clearly desirable that everyone has access to a full range of medical 
services and drugs, the lack of resources means that there are unfortunately in the Contracting states many 
individuals who do not enjoy them, especially in the case of expensive treatments.’ Further, in dismissing 
the claim under Article 8, the Court underscored the great improvement that dialysis would bring for the 
applicant’s private and family life but found that Moldova had struck a reasonable balance between the 
competing interests of the applicant and the community as a whole.
87 For a discussion of the scope of Article 8 in relation to a bundle of social rights, see below.
88 See, for example, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), Application Nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 
Judgment dated 12 July 2005, concerning the Haderini pogrom (carried out with police complicity) in 
which the applicants homes had been destroyed, as a result of which they lived in appalling conditions for 
ten years, suffering very detrimental effects on their health and well-being. In conjunction with the racial 
discrimination that they suffered, this constituted an interference with the applicants’ human dignity and 
amount to degrading treatment and a breach of Article 3.
89 O’Rourke v. United Kingdom, Application No. 39022/97 (unreported), Judgment of 26 June 2001, 
where the Court recognised that, although a failure to provide shelter does not by itself amount to degrading 
or inhuman treatment, it has not ruled out the possibility that such a positive obligation might arise.
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physical and mental effects and in some circumstances the sex, age and state of health 
of the victim – a standard applied both in determining whether treatment falls into the 
categories of inhuman or degrading treatment and in distinguishing between those types 
of treatment and torture.90
 In the case of Pretty v. UK,91 the Court had the opportunity to consider the scope of 
the positive obligation to refrain from the types of maltreatment prohibited by Article 
3. In the fi rst instance, the Court observed that ‘it is impossible by a single defi nition 
to embrace all human conditions that will engage Article 3’. Nevertheless, drawing on 
previous case law, it concluded in summary that
Ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3, is that which ‘attains a minimum level of severity and involves 
actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering’ or which ‘humiliates or debases an individual 
showing lack of respect for, or diminishing his or her human dignity’ or ‘arouses feelings of fear, anguish 
or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance’.92
Thus, in the context of prison detention (where indignities are likely to be exacerbated 
by the deprivation of liberty), the Court has found positive breaches of Article 3 in 
cases of failure to provide adequate food or recreation,93 suitable physical conditions 
of detention or appropriate medical care to detainees, even where the suffering has 
been endured for a relatively short period of time.94 For example, in Peers v. Greece,95 
the Court found an infringement of Article 3 in that the complainant was obliged to 
share a one-person cell with another inmate, to use the cell toilet in the other’s presence 
and to suffer the deprivation of natural light and ventilation. Further, in reaching this 
conclusion, the Court commented that, although the applicant had been subjected to 
these conditions for a relatively short period of two months, the authorities had taken no 
positive steps to improve them during that time.
 It has also been made clear by the Court that, although an intention to debase is a 
factor to be taken into account in determining whether treatment is ‘degrading’, the 
absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a fi nding that there has been a 
violation of Article 3. Thus, in Price v. UK,96 where the applicant, a Thalidomide victim 
with severely impaired mobility, was committed to prison for seven days for contempt 
of court, the ECtHR considered that ‘to detain a severely disabled person in conditions 
where she is dangerously cold, risks developing sores because her bed is too hard and 
unreachable, and is unable to go to the toilet and keep clean, without the greatest of 
diffi culty, constitutes degrading treatment contrary to Article 3’.97 Therefore, while 
recognising that the applicant’s degradation was not due to any intention to debase her, 
the majority concluded that the failure of the prison to meet her individual physical and 
medical needs constituted an infringement of Article 3.
 The reasoning in cases such as Price is therefore important, since it demonstrates 
that, disengaged from the political minefi eld of psychiatric care, where the ECtHR 
has been particularly reluctant to impose positive obligations to provide access to 
appropriate medical care,98 it may now be prepared draw a direct correlation between 
the extent of an individual’s disability and the positive obligations of states parties to 
provide services tailored to her health and welfare needs. Let us turn then to the question 
raised in the introduction to this article: how far does the positive obligation in Article 
90 Ireland v. United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, at para. 162.
91 (2002) 35 EHRR 1.
92 Id., at para. 52.
93 In Dougoz v. Greece, Judgment of 6 March 2001, (2002) 34 EHRR 330, the detention centre in which 
the applicant, a Syrian national, had been held for eighteen months was severely overcrowded; One hundred 
detainees were held in twenty cells; there were inadequate facilities for heating, sanitation food, recreation 
and contact with the outside world. The Court concluded that serious overcrowding and absence of sleeping 
facilities, combined with the inordinate length of the period during which the applicant was detained in such 
conditions, amounted to degrading treatment under Article 3.
94 Hurtado v. Switzerland A.280A (1994).
95 Peers v. Greece (2001) 33 EHRR 1192.
96 (2002) 34 EHRR 1285.
97 Id., at para. 24.
98 See Aerts v. Belgium, Application No. 25357/94, Judgment dated 30 July 1998. The Court was critical 
of the appalling standards in the psychiatric wing, but there was no evidence that the failure to provide 
psychiatric care had an adverse effect on the applicant’s mental health in violation of Article 3.
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3 require the taking of measures to protect vulnerable individuals from degradation and 
suffering (caused by the deprivation of elementary needs) outside the prison gates, that 
is to say, beyond circumstances where individual freedom and personal autonomy are 
so fundamentally threatened?
3.2.1  Developing the Normative Content of Socio-Economic Rights: 
Beyond the Prison Gates?
Outside the context of compulsory detention, few complaints have come before the 
Strasbourg organs alleging that a failure to provide for the health or welfare needs of 
vulnerable claimants has constituted a breach of Article 3. Nevertheless, the Court made 
it clear in Z v. UK,99 a case where young children for many years suffered neglect, 
including physical and mental abuse, at the hands of their parents (non-state actors), 
that positive measures may be necessary to protect individuals from degrading and 
inhuman circumstances of the kind prohibited by Article 3 in cases where authorities 
know that there is a real risk of such an occurrence. Moreover, two frequently cited 
cases heard by the Court during the past decade have been widely viewed as authority 
for the proposition that states parties may be liable for violations of Article 3, in extreme 
circumstances, where there is a real risk that degradation and suffering are likely to 
be exacerbated by the failure of states parties to provide for the elementary health and 
welfare needs of individuals in their jurisdictions.
 In the fi rst of those cases, D v. United Kingdom,100 the applicant relied on an important 
line of authority, following Soering v. UK,101 in which the ECtHR had demonstrated its 
willingness to extend the concept of a state’s responsibility beyond its borders102 by 
interpreting Article 3 as including a prohibition on extradition or deportation, in cases 
where there is a risk that an individual would face a suffi ciently serious risk of ill-
treatment if returned to another state. The applicant in D, a drug dealer from St Kitts 
with an extensive criminal record, was suffering from AIDS. Following a proposal by 
the UK government to return him to his country of origin, where there was generally 
a very low standard of healthcare and where treatment and ancillary support for AIDS 
sufferers was virtually non-existent, he complained to Strasbourg that the decision to 
deport him constituted a violation of Article 3.
 Thus, in a hearing, which took place when the applicant was in the fi nal stages of his 
illness, infl uenced by such factors as the imminence of his death, the lack of sanitation 
in the hospital in St Kitts and the fact that there may not even be a bed for him there, 
the Court concluded that the proposed deportation amounted to violation of Article 3. 
The Court was clear that ‘aliens subject to expulsion are not entitled to remain in a state 
for the sole purpose of continuing to benefi t from medical, social or other forms of 
assistance’, but concluded that ‘in the very exceptional circumstances of this case and 
given the compelling humanitarian considerations at stake it must be concluded that the 
99 (2001) 34 EHRR 97. In Z v. UK, a network of relevant domestic authorities – the social services schools 
and the police – had failed to protect young children who suffered severe neglect and abuse over many years 
at the hands of their parents.
100 D v. UK (1997) 24 EHRR 423.
101 See above at note 58.
102 See also Chahal v. UK (1997) 23 EHRR 413; Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 248; 
Jabari v. Turkey, Application No. 40035/98, Judgment of 11 July 2000. Starting with Soering in 1989, in 
a series of cases, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 as including an absolute prohibition on extradition 
or expulsion where there is a suffi cient risk that the complainant will face serious ill-treatment if returned 
to another state, thereby demonstrating the willingness of the ECtHR to extend the concept of state 
responsibility beyond a state’s own borders.
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implementation of the decision to remove the applicant must be a violation of Article 
3’.103 Moreover, the ‘very high threshold’ established in D’s case, has recently been 
confi rmed by the ECtHR in N v. UK.104
 In that case, the applicant was a Ugandan national due to be returned to Uganda 
after her asylum claim had been rejected. She had been diagnosed with AIDS on her 
arrival in the United Kingdom, and, as a result of the free anti-retroviral medication 
that she had been receiving from the NHS, she was in a stable condition with a good 
prospect of remaining well for many more decades. At the same time, however, there 
was strong evidence that if she were deported to Uganda it would be highly unlikely that 
she could afford to pay for her treatment (even though it was generally available and 
highly subsidised). Thus, it was accepted by the House of Lords that once denied the 
level of medical care she had been receiving in the United Kingdom, after a period of 
acute physical and mental suffering, early death would follow. Thus, it was recognised 
that, in light of advances in the treatment of AIDS, the reality of the choice facing the 
authorities was to allow the patient to be sustained by expensive medical care in the 
United Kingdom for the rest of her life or by deporting her to Uganda to precipitate an 
immediate decline in health and shortly after that her death. The claimant then turned to 
Strasbourg.
 While accepting that the quality of the applicant’s life and her life expectancy would 
be affected if she were to be returned to Uganda, the Grand Chamber found against the 
applicant by fourteen votes to three, observing that in contrast to D’s position, she was 
not yet critically ill and that the ‘rapidity of the deterioration which she would suffer 
and the extent to which she would be able to obtain access to medical treatment support 
and care, including help from relatives must involve a certain degree of speculation’,105 
particularly as AIDS treatment was evolving world-wide. Moreover, in response to 
criticism by the House of Lords of a lack of principled direction from the ECtHR on the 
issue, the Grand Chamber made an important general comment:
… Advances in medical science together with social and economic differences between countries entail that 
the level of treatment available in the contracting state and the country of origin may vary considerably… 
Article 3 does not place an obligation on the contracting state to alleviate such disparities through the 
provision of free and unlimited healthcare to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A 
fi nding to the contrary would place to great a burden on the contracting state.106
 In the second case, O’Rourke v. UK,107 the applicant was a vulnerable individual 
who on coming out of prison was provided with temporary accommodation pending a 
decision by the local authority as to whether he was eligible for housing as a homeless 
person. Following his eviction by the authority from temporary accommodation, he 
lived rough on the streets for fourteen months, eventually complaining to Strasbourg that 
his eviction and the subsequent failure to provide him with accommodation constituted 
violations of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. The Court did not consider the suffering that 
followed his eviction to have reached the requisite level of severity to engage Article 3.
 Moreover, since he was largely considered to be the author of his own misfortune (he 
had failed to visit a night shelter and indicated his unwillingness to accept temporary 
accommodation), there would have been no infringement of Article 3 even if it had 
reached the requisite level of severity. Nevertheless, the Court did accept that, although 
103 D v. United Kingdom, at para. 54. As far as this author is aware, only three HIV/AIDS cases have 
been found admissible since D. See BB v. France, ECHR 1998-VI, 2596, where the Commission decided 
that deportation of a claimant suffering from AIDS would constitute a violation of Article 3 and France 
refrained from deportation. In Tatete v. Switzerland, Application No. 41874/98, Judgment of 18 November 
1998, the Commission decided that the case raised complicated issues of fact and law and could not be said 
to be manifestly ill-founded. The principle in D has also been relied on in relation to other serious illnesses. 
See Bensaid v. UK (2001) 33 EHRR 205, where the ECtHR decided that deporting a person with severe 
mental illness could engage Article 3. See also Brems, above note 1, for an exhaustive review of cases 
(including diagnoses of AIDS an mental illness) where it has been argued (a) that the applicant is not (yet) 
very ill; and/or (b) that treatment and family support are available in his or her home country (at 141). 
104 N v. UK, Application No. 26565/05, Judgment of 27 May 2008, applies beyond cases of AIDS, to 
physical and mental illness generally (Id., at para. 47).
105 Id., at para. 50.
106 Id., at para. 44. But compare the strongly dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann.
107 Application No. 39022/97, Admissibility decision, 26 June 2001.
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failure to provide shelter could not of itself amount to degrading and inhuman treatment, 
a positive obligation to make social provisions of the kind required by the applicant 
could arise in a case of suffi ciently acute individual need. Further, it was recognised 
that, as in the case of D v. the United Kingdom, compliance with the negative duty 
in Article 3 could give rise to such positive undertakings in cases where a course of 
conduct pursued by the state (deportation or eviction) is likely to result in inhuman or 
degrading consequences for the individual concerned.
 In N v. UK,108 we have seen that, although it continues to leave a very wide margin 
of appreciation to national authorities, especially in individual prioritisation disputes 
over healthcare needs of the kind that arose in Sentges under Article 8,109 the ECtHR no 
longer baulks at providing answers to some of the most searching resource allocation 
questions. However, in contrast to the Court’s rejection of those prioritisation claims, 
it would appear that, even though it may not be easy to lay responsibility at the door 
of the state in cases of severe destitution such as O’Rourke v. UK, the Convention may 
require a measure of basic socio-economic provision, in the light of the duty to ensure 
that rights guaranteed by the Convention are not merely ‘theoretical and illusory’ but 
‘practical and effective’, coupled with the positive obligation under Article 3.
 Thus, as we shall see below (regardless of  whether so-called positive or negative 
rights are at issue) under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, a principled jurisprudence has begun 
to emerge whereby states may be held responsible for extreme socio-economic defi cits 
in circumstances where it can be shown that there are direct and verifi able links between 
the conduct of the state or its agents and the origins or continuation of conduct that has 
caused intolerable harm.
3.3 The Promise of Article 8: The Protection of Physical and Psychological 
Integrity
Article 8 has been primarily associated with the socio-economic right to housing. 
However, it has become clear that, in order to comply with Article 8, states parties 
may be required to protect individuals in respect of a broader bundle of social needs.110 
Thus, in addition to a continuing negative obligation not to interfere with the enjoyment 
of a person’s  private and family life and home, in the case of individuals suffering 
from a disability, they may be required to take positive steps to provide them with an 
environment that will facilitate their enjoyment of autonomy and a more independent 
life.
 The Court fi rst considered the extent to which Article 8 gives rise to positive state 
obligations to make social provision for vulnerable individuals in Botta v. Italy,111 
a case in which the applicant complained of ‘impairment of his private life and the 
development of his personality’, resulting from the Italian government’s failure to take 
appropriate measures to remedy the omissions of the private bathing establishments. 
The essence of his complaint was that his Article 8 rights had been infringed because of 
his inability to enjoy a normal social life, ‘which would enable him to participate in the 
life of the community, by the exercise of his essential non-pecuniary personal rights’.112
 It was recognised in Botta that the duty to protect physical and emotional integrity 
could arise even where there had been no direct interference by the state.113 However, 
the Court refused to fi nd that there had been a violation of Article 8 in a case where the 
right asserted by the applicant (to gain access to beach and sea at a place distant from 
his normal place of residence during the holidays) ‘concerned interpersonal relations 
of such broad and indeterminate scope that there could be no conceivable direct link 
108 See above at note 104.
109 See above at note 54. 
110 In the United Kingdom in the fi rst case in which compensation was granted under the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) of 1998.
111 (1998) 26 EHRR 241.
112 Id., at para. 27.
113 Id., at paras. 32-33.
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between the measures the State was urged to take and the applicant’s private life.’114 
However, it was also recognised that, in principle, Article 8 could give rise to precisely 
the type of affi rmative duties for which the applicant had argued in cases where it was 
possible to establish ‘a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an 
applicant and the latter’s private and/or family life.’115
 In its concurring opinion, the minority of the Commission in Botta had agreed that the 
precise aim and nature of the measures to be undertaken for handicapped people would 
vary from place to place and that this was an area where a wide discretion would be left 
to national governments. Moreover, the ECtHR also recalled the more cautious opinion 
of the Commission’s majority, namely that, in the light of the resources necessary to 
satisfy such a claim, ‘the social nature’ of the rights at issue rendered them more suitable 
for protection under the ‘fl exible’ machinery of the ESC.116
Since Botta, human rights advocates have continued to explore the scope of the obligation 
under Article 8 to take positive measures to permit disabled people to enjoy autonomy 
and independence in the wider community. However, in the fi rst of two poorly received 
test cases, the ECtHR emphasised that ‘Article 8 cannot be taken to be generally 
applicable each time an individual’s everyday life is disrupted’, but only in exceptional 
cases where the State’s failure to adopt measures interferes with that individual’s right to 
personal development and his right to establish and maintain relations with other human 
beings and the outside world. Thus, in Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the Czech Republic,117 
where the applicants had complained of their inability to access a number of public 
buildings in their home town, the ECtHR not only doubted that they needed to do so 
on a daily basis but also denied any direct and immediate link between the measures 
sought and the applicants private lives. Article 8 was not applicable and the complaint 
was inadmissible.
 In the later case of Sentges v. the Netherlands,118 the applicant, who had seriously 
impaired mobility due to an acute form of muscular dystrophy, complained that refusal 
by authorities to provide a robotic arm to be attached to his electronic car (on grounds 
that regulations for the supply of medical technologies would not cover it) constituted a 
violation of Article 8. Again the ECtHR doubted that the situation complained of touched 
the essential core of the applicant’s private life. However, the ECtHR stressed that even 
if it did, this complaint fell squarely into the type of resource allocation disputes where a 
wide margin of appreciation was left to the authorities themselves to strike a fair balance 
between the competing interests of the individual and the community; which in this case 
they had effectively done.
3.4 Beyond Arbitrary Interference: The Right to a Home?
The core idea of respect for the ‘home’ in Article 8 ECHR has been said to be one 
of sanctuary against intrusion by public authorities, that is, an essentially negative 
obligation.119 However, as we have already seen, there is a wide penumbra of positive 
114 Id., at para. 35.
115 Id., at para. 34.
116 Botta v. Italy, Proceedings before the Commission, 246-255. For the concurring minority opinion on 
the application of the margin of appreciation of Judges Liddy, Tune, Pellonpää, Bratza, Sváby, Perenic and 
Schermers, see 251-252.
117 Application No. 38621/97, Admissibility decision, 14 May 2002. In Zehnalova, the applicant partners, 
one of whom was disabled, sought to distinguish their case from Botta, because the complaint related 
to their home town and everyday facilities, such as the post offi ce, police station most specialist doctors 
surgeries and the town swimming pool. They argued that the lack of access to these facilities impaired their 
mobility and ability to enjoy autonomy and a normal life in the community. Clements and Simmons have 
suggested that had the applicants focused their application more precisely on details of the impact of the 
state failure on their private lives, it might have forced the ECtHR to scrutinise the scope of the social care 
duty in greater detail. See above note at 1, at 426.
118 See above at note 54.
119 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, above note 38, at 376. See complaints against Turkey concerning the 
burning of houses by security forces, where the ECtHR found that the destruction of the applicants’ homes 
and properties constituted particularly grave and unjustifi ed interferences with the their right to respect for 
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connotations in the idea of respect for ‘home and private life’.120 Further, it is clear 
that the state will facilitate the right to live in one’s home rather than merely protect it 
against interference as an existing property right.121 Nevertheless, although there are 
positive state obligations to protect against ‘home deprivation’ and its consequences 
in many contexts,122 the ECtHR has attempted to set justiciable boundaries around the 
gargantuan social problem of homelessness in Europe by using the well-known mantra 
that ‘there is no right to a home.’ Thus, in Chapman v. UK,123 the ECtHR familiarly 
stated that
while it is clearly desirable that every human being have a place where he or she can live in dignity and 
which she can call home, there are unfortunately in the Contracting States many persons who have no 
home. Whether the state provides funds to enable every one to have a home is a matter for political not 
judicial decision.124
Nevertheless, the statement that there is no right to a home sits uneasily with the 
development in Marzari v. Italy,125 the fi rst case in which the ECtHR clearly stated that, 
although not creating a right to a home per se, the positive duty in Article 8 to respect 
private family life did not absolve the government of all responsibilities in respect of 
housing needs.
 Thus, in Marzari, the Court recognised that
Although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one’s housing problems solved by the authorities, a 
refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this respect to an individual suffering from a severe disease 
might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8.126
Further, in determining whether the interference complained of was necessary 
in a democratic society, the Court stressed that the applicant’s medical condition 
was particularly relevant to his need for accommodation, as the applicant had to be 
hospitalised as a consequence of his living in a camper van after his eviction. Moreover, 
although the ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 in Marzari, in performing the 
exercise of appreciation, as in Botta, it took the important step of recognising that, in 
the case of a person suffering from a disability, the burden of justifying the refusal of 
accommodation under Article 8(2) might be greater than in other cases.
 However, in Chapman v. UK,127 one of several UK gypsy cases, which concerned 
an interference with the applicant’s Article 8 interests caused by a failure to grant her 
planning permission to live in a caravan on her land,128 eight members of the ECtHR 
their home, private and family life. See also Selcuck and Asker v. Turkey (1996) 26 EHRR 477. The positive 
state obligations under Article 8 may also relate to the right to ‘adequate housing’, although it appears from 
the case law that these obligations rest more clearly on the ‘private and family life’ components of Article 
8 than on the specifi c reference to ‘respect for home’. Thus, case law on environmental protection (the duty 
to protect against severe pollution) can extend further to ensuring adequate housing. See Lopez Ostra v. 
Spain, above note 65. State obligation in this area may include the provision of alternative accommodation. 
See Fadeyeva v. Russia, Application No. 55723/00, 9 June 2005.
120 The essential ingredient of family life is the right to live together so that family relationships may 
develop normally. See Marckx v. Belgium, above note 31; Powell & Rayner v. UK, above note 69, which 
concerned a duty to protect a person’s home and family life from the negative interference of environmental 
pollution.
121 See Howard v. UK, Application No. 10825/84, 52 DR 198 (1987). See also Cyprus v. Turkey, Application 
Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, where the Commission dealt with the denial to Greek Cypriots of access to their 
homes in the North of Turkey under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
122 See, for example, Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 1), Application Nos. 411138/96 and 64320/01, 
Judgment dated 5 July 2005. It has been suggested that ‘this is best described as a remedial right – to 
compensate for deprivation of housing’. See Clements and Simmons, above note 1, at 413.
123 2001-I; 33 EHRR 399.
124 Id., at para. 99G.
125 Admissibility decision, 4 May 1999 (1999) 28 EHRR.
126 Ibid, at 179.
127 See above at note 123.
128 In the United Kingdom, there has been a series of cases, starting with Buckley v. the United Kingdom, 
Application No. 20348/92, where it has been alleged that land development controls have unfairly 
discriminated against Gypsies, with the result that almost 30% of them are technically homeless. Further, 
it has been argued that controls, which make it particularly diffi cult to obtain permission for the stationing 
of a caravan, constitute a form of indirect discrimination. Secondly, complainants have argued that the 
legitimate state action has had a disproportionate (if unintended) socio-economic effect and that either 
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recalled in a strong dissenting opinion that, although the essential object of Article 8 
is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by public authorities, there may in 
addition be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect for private and family 
life and home’. In addition, they noted that positive duties to respect a person’s home 
might arise even in cases where there has been no state interference of the kind identifi ed 
in Chapman. Thus, in considering whether the applicant’s eviction served a ‘pressing 
social need’, referring to the judgments in Marzari129 and Botta,130 the minority recalled 
that ‘where there is a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an 
applicant and the latter’s private life, positive obligations may be imposed on states’.
 Since Chapman, the ECtHR has demonstrated that, in sensitive ‘housing’ cases 
concerning the legitimacy of interference (rather than of the state’s failure to provide 
housing), the Strasbourg Court will not routinely fall back on the wide margin of 
appreciation associated with domestic resource allocation issues or issues of general 
housing policy. Thus, in Connors v. United Kingdom,131 which concerned the legality 
of a gypsy’s forced eviction from a local authority caravan site, on the grounds of 
the alleged misbehaviour of his extended family, the ECtHR modifi ed its position in 
Chapman: in Connors, weighty reasons of public interest would be required to justify 
the very severe interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights, namely eviction and 
homelessness resulting in very detrimental effects on his and his family’s health and 
education, circumstances that had not existed in Chapman.132
 Accordingly, in Connors, the ECtHR stated that ‘a margin of appreciation must 
inevitably be left to the national authorities’, which ‘by reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, are, in principle, better placed 
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions’.133 However, on the 
issue of proportionality, the Court stated that although in general ‘it is for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment of necessity, the fi nal evaluation as to whether 
the reasons cited for the interference are relevant and suffi cient remains subject to 
review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention’.134 The 
margin will therefore vary ‘according to the nature of the Convention right in issue, its 
importance for the individual and the nature of the activities restricted, as well as the 
aim pursued by the restrictions’.135 It will ‘tend to be narrower where the right at stake 
is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights’.136
 By contrast, however, a wide margin of appreciation is more likely to be applied in 
contexts such as planning, in so far as ‘the exercise of discretion involving a multitude 
of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies’.137 
Thus, ‘in spheres such as housing, which play a central role in the welfare and economic 
policies of modern societies’ (particularly in cases where Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is 
in play), the legislature’s judgement as to what is in the general interest will generally 
the scheme should be amended to make it possible for them to fi nd their own accommodation or the state 
should take responsibility for its provision. A third argument was added in Chapman, namely that there 
was a need for special consideration to be given to the cultural life of Gypsies, both in the regulatory 
planning framework and in arriving at decisions in specifi c cases. The Court considered that the margin 
of appreciation was being measured by reference to ‘an emerging international consensus amongst the 
contracting States of the Council of Europe, recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation 
to protect their security, identity and lifestyle’ (para. 93).
129 See above at note 125.
130 See above at note 111.
131 [2004] ECHR 223, Judgment of 27 May 2004.
132 In Connors, the applicant and his family had lived on a local authority caravan site for thirteen years. 
Following their eviction due to the alleged misbehaviour, the family were forced to move on continuously 
and the stress led to the break down of the applicant’s marriage. In fi nding a violation, the ECtHR 
emphasised the lack of procedural protection for Gypsies in comparison to the local authority reviews of 
anti-social behaviour on local authority housing estates. Although the applicant denied the allegations, he 
had no opportunity to challenge them in court.
133 Id., at para. 82.
134 Id., at para. 81.
135 Gillow v. United Kingdom, A.104 (1986) 11 EHRR 335, at para. 55.
136 Connors, above note 131, at para. 82.
137 Id., at para.82.
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be respected, ‘unless that judgement is manifestly without reasonable foundation’.138 It 
is also possible to distinguish cases such as Mellacher v. Austria (founded on Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1) from disputes founded on Article 8, which was said uniquely to 
‘concern rights of central importance to the individual’s identity, self-determination, 
physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and 
secure place in the community’.139
 Moreover, the ECtHR has emphasised that, even where general social and economic 
policy considerations arise under Article 8, ‘the scope of the margin of appreciation 
depends on the context of the case, with particular signifi cance attaching to the extent 
of the intrusion into the personal sphere of the applicant’. In Connors, the ‘eviction of 
the applicant and his family … was not attended by the requisite procedural safeguards, 
namely the requirement to establish proper justifi cation for the serious interference 
with his rights’. It could not be regarded as justifi ed by a ‘pressing social need’ or 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued’. Accordingly, there had been a 
violation of Article 8.
 In the United Kingdom, there is a palpable tension between the use of eviction as a 
legitimate tool for the management of depleted social housing stock and the effective 
protection of the right to respect for the home in Article 8 ECHR. This tension had not 
been directly addressed in Connors. In the later case of McCann v. UK,140 the ECtHR 
was therefore asked to consider whether the applicant’s eviction from his home (which 
served a legitimate aim and had been conducted in accordance with relevant legal 
procedures) constituted an interference with his right to respect for his home.141 As in 
Connors, the central question was therefore was whether, in the applicant’s case, the 
interference was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.142 Signifi cantly, 
the ECtHR held that it was not, suggesting that domestic law must always permit 
the proportionality of removing a person from his or her home to be assessed by an 
independent tribunal (which is currently not the case in the United Kingdom) if it is to 
comply with Article 8.143
 Despite the potential of the positive obligation in Article 8 to protect vulnerable 
individuals even in respect of housing needs, strategic case law has continued to 
refl ect a bias towards claims involving negative interference with the enjoyment 
of an existing home. Although regrettable, this is not surprising. Here, perhaps 
more than in any other area of social need, we see the jurisprudential limits of a 
judicial approach that is defensively rooted in the negative positive dichotomy 
of rights, rather than in a normative framework according to which questions of 
state responsibility are examined in the light of the nature and extent of threats to 
rights and the extent to which the state or its agents can be said to be responsible 
for the defi cit.
138 Id., at para. 82.
139 The ECtHR cited Pretty v. UK, above note 71, and Christine Goodwin v. UK, Application No. 28957/95, 
ECHR 2002-VI, para. 90.
140 Application No. 19009/04, 13 May 2008.
141 Mr McCann and his wife were joint secure council tenants. Mrs McCann was re-housed by the council 
on the grounds of domestic violence. At the council’s instigation, she signed a notice to quit (without 
realising that this would bring the joint tenancy to an end). Mr McCann sought to transfer the tenancy to his 
own name but was duly evicted.
142 The ECtHR refused to accept the UK government’s contention that the Connors decision was to be 
confi ned only to cases involving Gypsies or where applicants sought to challenge the law itself rather than 
its application in their particular case.
143 Notably, however, the UK House of Lords has decided to depart from the judgment in McCann, arguing 
that it was based on a fundamental failure to understand the complexities of English housing law and 
therefore need not be followed in the domestic courts. See Doherty and others v. Birmingham City Council 
[2008] UKHL 57.
 PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS THROUGH THE ECHR 419
4 Articles 6 and 14: Towards the Fair Distribution of Socio-Economic 
Entitlements in Member States?
Thus far, our review of cases has focused on the potential to protect broadly framed, 
open-textured rights of the kind enshrined in Articles 11-12 ICESCR ‘to an adequate 
standard of living of everyone for himself and his family’ or ‘to the right of everyone 
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’.144 By contrast, the 
development of the fair trial right in Article 6 and the non-discrimination provision in 
Article 14 has been coupled with attempts to gain access to substantive rights with an 
economic component (of the kind enshrined in Article 9 ICESCR (social security)) or 
other substantive rights, such as property and education, both of which are protected 
in the ECHR itself. Thus, in the following review of cases, we fi nd a tension between 
the role of the ECtHR in promoting the notion of socio-economic rights as possessory 
individual entitlements and its more recent use of a more open-textured principle of 
equality, coupled with the Strasbourg principle of proportionality, to achieve fairness in 
the distribution of public goods.
4.1 Article 6 ECHR: Access to Administrative Justice in Social Security 
Claims
We have already seen how the right to free legal assistance as a ‘social’ dimension 
of the right to a fair trial was fi rst emphasised by the ECtHR in Airey.145 Since then, 
moreover, the ECtHR has continued to recognise that the specifi c guarantees protected 
by Article 6, such as the right to an oral hearing or legal aid, can be crucial in assisting 
disadvantaged individuals to gain access to assistance that might otherwise be denied in 
criminal proceedings.146
 However, it is well known that Article 6 does not apply to all proceedings – only 
to those concerning the ‘determination of civil rights and obligations’ or ‘a criminal 
charge’ – and that in interpreting these concepts the ECtHR has given them ‘autonomous 
meanings’ that in many cases depart from their meanings in domestic law. Thus, 
gradually, the scope of the concept of ‘civil rights and obligations’ in Article 6 has been 
widened to encompass a right of access to courts or tribunals in public law disputes over 
most discretionary socio-economic entitlements. For example, even though the right to 
health insurance benefi ts under social security schemes is treated as a public law right 
in the Netherlands, in Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands,147 it was held to constitute a civil 
right within the autonomous meaning of Article 6(1).148
 Moreover, the ECtHR has held that the formal principle of equality of treatment 
dictates that Article 6 should apply even in cases where a socio-economic benefi t is 
derived from a discretionary, non-contributory form of public assistance granted 
unilaterally by the state149 and where the cost is fully borne by the public purse without 
any link to a private contract of employment.150 Thus, in Salesi v. Italy,151 the defi nition of 
a civil right was said to cover social security or welfare benefi ts regarded as ‘suffi ciently 
144 See above at note 9.
145 See above at note 5.
146 Article 6(3)(c) guarantees the right to a person charged with a criminal offence to have access to practical 
and effective legal assistance. See Lundevall v. Sweden, Application No. 38629/97, 12 November 2002; 
Sallomonsson v. Sweden, Application No. 38978/97, 12 November 2002; Miller v. Sweden, Application 
No. 55853/00, 8 February 2005.
147 (1986) 8 EHRR 245.
148 See also Konig v. Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 170. The ECtHR concluded that the right to practice 
medicine in West Germany was a civil one. The fact that the medical profession did not provide a ‘public 
service’ in Germany was taken into account in reaching this conclusion.
149 Salesi v. Italy (1993) 26 EHRR 187.
150 Where a pension is linked to employment, even to employment in the civil service, the ECtHR has 
held a fortiori that Article 6 will be engaged. See Lombardo v. Italy (1992) 21 EHRR 18, at paras. 14-17; 
McGinley and Egan v. United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 1, at para. 84.
151 See above at note 149.
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well defi ned to be analogous to rights in private law’ and to be of ‘economic signifi cance 
to the claimant’.152 Since the features of private law claims predominated, the right to 
social security benefi ts was a civil right within the meaning of Article 6.153
 However, the approach of the ECtHR to remedying the failure of the Convention 
to afford rights of due process in public law disputes has been problematic. In many 
jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, the requirement of a ‘full hearing’ under 
Article 6 disturbs existing models of administrative dispute resolution and the public 
private jurisdictional divide. Thus, seeking a fl exible accommodation in the case of 
Bryan v. UK,154 the ECtHR concluded that ‘full jurisdiction’ in public law disputes 
means jurisdiction to deal with the case as the nature of the decision requires, in 
accordance with the dictates of ‘democratic accountability, effi cient administration and 
the sovereignty of Parliament’.155 Problematically, however, there is no clear guidance 
as to how the criteria enunciated in Bryan are to be applied in national jurisdictions. 
Thus, for example, in the United Kingdom, there has been intense litigation concerning 
the limits of the right to a ‘full hearing’ in administrative disputes over discretionary 
socio-economic entitlements,156 culminating in the recent case of Tfsayo v. United 
Kingdom.157
 Tfsayo’s case concerned the application of Article 6 ECHR to a decision by a housing 
benefi ts review tribunal to refuse payment of housing benefi t to a non-English-speaking 
asylum seeker, because she had failed to show ‘good cause’ why she had not submitted 
her renewal claim on time. On her complaint to Strasbourg, the ECtHR decided that the 
tribunal had been in breach of Article 6, irrespective of whether the claimant had had 
access to a traditional judicial review hearing on appeal. In her case, the ECtHR insisted 
that intricately linked to the councillors’ manifest lack of independence was the ‘limited 
control’ that could be exercised by the reviewing court:158 It did not have jurisdiction 
to rehear the evidence or to substitute its own views as to the applicant’s credibility. 
Nor indeed did it have the power to order the decision to be taken by a different body. 
This meant ‘that there was never a possibility that the central issue of the applicant’s 
credibility would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the parties 
to the dispute. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 6(1)’.159
 On the facts in Tfsayo, in seeking to give effect to rights that were ‘real and not 
illusory’, the ECtHR concluded that there had been an infringement of the claimant’s right 
to a fair and impartial hearing. However, if the ECtHR’s approach to the interpretation 
of Article 6 in that case is accepted in the United Kingdom, it could mean that disputes 
of fact can no longer be determined internally at fi rst instance: the existing supervisory 
structure is inadequate to guarantee an impartial determination of all aspects of the 
dispute. The decision therefore threatens to disrupt established internal administrative 
procedures for the allocation of welfare entitlements that have long been regarded in the 
United Kingdom as hedged by suffi cient safeguards to satisfy the guarantees in Article 
6.
 The right to administrative due process has often been regarded as one of the most 
important avenues for the protection of socio-economic rights of the vulnerable and 
marginalised.160 However, in the incremental extension of Article 6 to public law 
152 Ringeisen v. Austria (No. 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455.
153 This was despite a powerful dissent from seven members of the court, who said that the distinctions 
between public and private law were being eroded in a way that would cause great uncertainty.
154 (1996) 21 EHRR 342.
155 Per Lord Hoffman in Begum (FC) v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5, at paras. 35 
and 43.
156 In Runa Begum v. Tower Hamlets London BC (Runa Begum) [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 1 All ER 689-800, 
the House of Lords held that administrative burdens and other societal costs associated with constitutional 
entitlements to a full evidentiary hearing should legitimate a more limited form of adjudication in disputed 
claims to discretionary welfare benefi ts.
157 Application No. 60860/00, 14 November 2006.
158 Under the system as it applied, the hearing had taken place before a tribunal that consisted of members 
of the same local authority that would be required to pay 50% of the benefi t awarded in the event of a 
fi nding in the applicant’s favour.
159 Id., at paras. 46-49.
160 The access to justice movement in the United Kingdom was spearheaded by M. Cappelletti and had 
 PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS THROUGH THE ECHR 421
disputes, we see very clearly the disadvantages of a jurisprudence that has not developed 
according to abstract principles and standards but, in the case of Article 6, by analogy 
with private law dispute resolution, where very different principles, procedures and 
standards apply.
4.2 Article 14: The ECtHR Approach to the Fair Distribution of Social 
Security Benefi ts
It is well known that, in contrast to more sweeping provisions in many written 
constitutions and human rights instruments (most notably the very broad formulation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution),161 Article 14 has been restricted 
in two ways. First, the substantive arena in which discrimination is forbidden has been 
restricted to the ‘enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention’. 
Secondly, the grounds upon which discrimination is forbidden have been restricted to 
‘any ground such as [the specifi ed grounds] or other status’.162 Thus, Article 14 imposes 
a duty on the state and public authorities acting within the scope of Convention rights 
not to discriminate on the listed grounds or on the grounds of ‘other status’, unless the 
discrimination can be justifi ed.163
 Nevertheless, the ECtHR has attempted to overcome those restrictions by at times 
avoiding the ‘ambit’ discussion altogether – by treating some discriminatory acts as 
violations of Article 3164 or Article 8 ECHR165 – while in other cases bringing allegations 
of discriminatory treatment, for example in the distribution of social security benefi ts, 
within the ambit of Article 14. Thus, in Gaygusus v. Austria,166 the ECtHR confi rmed 
that, by analogy with the proprietary right of a contributor to a private pension fund, 
a claim to contributory benefi ts in the Austrian municipal system was a possession, 
thereby grounding the complaint within Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1.167 Moreover, relying on that approach in the case of Koua Poirrez v. 
France,168 the ECtHR decided that difference in treatment with respect to entitlements 
to social benefi ts between French nationals (or nationals of a country having signed a 
reciprocity agreement) and other foreign nationals was not based on any ‘objective and 
reasonable’ justifi cation. The Court therefore concluded that the government’s refusal to 
allow the applicant, an Ivorian national, to claim disability benefi ts constituted a breach 
a bias towards collective group action. See M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 
(Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill 1971).
161 Cf. also Article 26 ICCPR, which has a much stronger free-standing text than Article 14. See above at 
note 21.
162 Article 14 states: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’ Cf. 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12, which has been formulated by the Council of Europe to apply to ‘any right set 
forth by law’, thereby notionally extending its territory very widely.
163 Although those limitations have to some extent been addressed by the adoption of Protocol No. 12, 
many member states, including the United Kingdom, have failed to ratify the Protocol. As of July 2008, it 
had been ratifi ed by just seventeen states, although a further seventeen had signed it.
164 Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), above note 88 (racial discrimination); Price v. UK above 
note 96 (disability discrimination).
165 Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) has been successfully invoked in a series of cases 
concerning discrimination against gay men and lesbians and persons who have had gender reassignment. 
See Christine Goodwin v. UK, above note 139. See also the discussion of indirect discrimination in the 
Gypsies cases in note 128 and related text.
166 In Gaygusuz v. Austria, Application No. 17371/90, ECHR 1996-IV, 1129, a Turkish man who had 
worked in Austria for ten years had been refused the social benefi t of an advance on his pension in the form 
of emergency assistance on the grounds that it could only be claimed by Austrian citizens. The ECtHR 
concluded that this was discrimination under Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1.
167 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’
168 (2005) 40 EHRR 34 at 45, at para. 37.
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of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol 1.169 ‘Very weighty reasons 
would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment 
based exclusively on the ground of nationality to be compatible with the Convention’.170
 Although there are many jurisdictions, including a number of new accession 
countries, where, like in the United Kingdom,171 contributions to the social security 
fund are regarded as hardly distinguishable from general taxation,172 this diffi culty has 
been surmounted in Strasbourg by means of a technical argument to the effect that 
although a claim to a social security benefi t is a possessory right falling within the ambit 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, it differs from purely private law rights to the extent that 
it does entitle the claimant to ‘anything in particular’.173 Thus, the recent admissibility 
decision in Stec v. UK,174 in which the ECtHR extended the ambit of property rights to 
include any social security payment, was confi rmed by the Grand Chamber in 2007,175 
thereby deciding that, despite their non-contributory nature, such benefi ts are invariably 
governed by the non-discrimination principle.
 Until recently, Article 14 jurisprudence was overwhelmingly devoted to a formal 
equality model. Thus, although it has allowed for stricter standards of scrutiny in ‘suspect 
classes’ of discrimination, such as sex and most recently race,176 the ECtHR focused 
primarily on the extent to which there was a difference in treatment of analogously 
placed persons and situations before seeking to determine whether the difference 
served a legitimate aim and was proportionate. However, a more nuanced approach has 
developed in social security case law, as demonstrated in the Court’s recent decision in 
Carson v. UK.177 That case concerned the general policy of the United Kingdom to pay 
index-linked pensions to residents while refusing to up-rate in the case of pensioners 
abroad. The ECtHR emphasised the importance of a wide margin of appreciation in 
cases involving social security systems (specifi cally pensions), referring also to the ‘very 
wide margin, which the state enjoys in matters of socio-economic policy’. However the 
ECtHR also stressed the importance of justifi cation and did not suggest that the courts 
should abnegate their reviewing role – where the state’s policy is not rational a national 
169 The applicant was of Ivorian nationality but resident in Paris and adopted by a French national.
170 The ECtHR relied on Gaygusuz v. Austria, above note 166, where, by contrast, the right to payments had 
been linked to the nature of the contributory system. But see the dissenting opinion of Judge Mularoni, who, 
distinguishing the instant case from Gaygusuz on the grounds that it involved non-contributory benefi ts for 
disabled people, argued that, although there had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. See 
Koua Poirrez, above note 168, at para. 46. See also Stec v. UK, above note 6, at para. 53 ‘If … a Contracting 
State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefi t – whether conditional 
or not on the prior payment of contributions – that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary 
interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements.’
171 See R (on the application of Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Carson) [2005] 
UKHL 37, at para. 12.
172 [2005] UKHL; [2005] 4 All ER 545-672.
173 See Jankovic v. Croatia (2000) 30 EHRR CD 183.
174 Application Nos. 67531/01 and 65900/01, 12 April 2006. Thus, in Stec v. UK, the ECtHR held by sixteen 
votes to one that there had been no violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
in respect of the cessation of Reduced Earnings Allowance (REA) at different ages for men and women: 
‘If … a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefi t 
– whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions – that legislation must be regarded as 
generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying 
its requirements.’ See Stec v. UK, above note 6, at para. 53.
175 As noted by Judge Borrego Borrego in his concurring judgment, by widening the notion of possessions 
to include welfare benefi ts and by establishing a link between Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, 
the ECtHR has by implication secured ‘the entry into force of Protocol No. 12 in a very important sphere 
(social security benefi ts) in respect of a Contracting Party which had not even signed Protocol 12’.
176 See, for example, Timishev v. Russia (2005) 44 EHRR 76.
177 Application No. 421845/05, 4 November 2008 (unreported) The case concerned the general policy 
of the United Kingdom to pay index-linked pensions to residents while refusing to up-rate in the case of 
pensioners abroad, unless resident in countries having reciprocal agreements with the United Kingdom.
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court may say so.178 Moreover, the ECtHR recently spelled out in Stec that a difference 
of treatment that is prima facie discrimination under Article 14 can be justifi ed in cases 
where it is intended to correct ‘factual inequalities’.179
 In contrast to this progress, however, we have also seen that limitations in the 
drafting of Article 6 and 14 have to some extent hampered the Convention’s evolution 
as an instrument for the principled resolution of disputes concerning the fair distribution 
of socio-economic entitlements in member states. In the case of Article 6, emphasis on 
a formal conception of equality, directed at the assimilation of public and private law 
claims, has left little room for the development of a Convention jurisprudence focused 
on what due process may require when discretionary socio-entitlements are withheld 
from vulnerable and dependent individuals in need.
 Moreover, as we have seen in the context of Article 14, a formal conception of equality 
has similarly encouraged the ECtHR to focus more closely on the artifi cial extension 
of the range of substantive socio-economic rights covered by the Convention than on 
efforts to address issues of socio-economic deprivation more holistically through the 
development of a substantive model of equality in the Convention jurisprudence.
4.3 Towards a Jurisprudence of Substantive Equality in the ECHR rights: 
the Promise of Article 14?
Dissatisfaction with the ECtHR’s approach to the application of Article 14 has recently 
been tempered. Since the case of Thlimmenos v. Greece,180 small steps have been taken 
to tackle the problem of indirect discrimination through the application of Article 14. 
For example, in the admissibility decision of Hoogendijk v. Netherlands,181 the Court 
accepted that an apparently neutral decision to terminate the availability of certain 
disability benefi ts had a differential impact on men and women and, although justifi ed, 
held that it fell within the meaning of discrimination under Article 14. Since then, 
moreover, in the important case of D.H. v. Czech Republic,182 founded on Article 14 
taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, the ECtHR accepted that ‘a difference in 
treatment’ under Article 14 may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects 
of a general policy or measure, which though couched in neutral terms discriminates 
against a group’.183 Thus, reaching beyond the approach to direct discrimination 
established in the Belgian Linguistics Case (No. 2)184 and followed in subsequent cases, 
the Grand Chamber accepted that in cases of indirect discrimination it was necessary for 
the ECtHR to adapt its previous case law on evidence.
 In D.H., eighteen applicants, all members of the Roma community, claimed that they 
had been victims of indirect discrimination with respect to the right to education. They 
relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 2. They pointed to the signifi cant under-representation 
of Roma children in their locality at ‘ordinary schools’, arguing that Roma children 
tended to be placed in ‘special schools’ for intellectually less able children, receiving 
178 Id., at para. 81. Moreover the ECtHR has specifi cally recognised that the margin of appreciation can 
cover the sort of nuanced judgments that states may have to make when determining cut-off dates for 
entitlements to benefi ts.
179 See Stec v. UK, above note 6. The differences in pensionable ages of men and women in the United 
Kingdom was meant to address the economically disadvantaged position of women.
180 In Thlimmenos v. Greece, Application No. 34369/97, 6 April 2000, which concerned the use of the 
applicant’s previous conviction for refusing to wear a military uniform (on the grounds of conscientious 
objection) in order to exclude him from the chartered accountants profession, the ECtHR held that the state’s 
failure to distinguish his case from that of more serious criminal offences from which it was ‘signifi cantly 
different’ meant that Article 14 taken together with Article 9 had been violated.
181 Application No. 58641/00, (2005) 40 EHRR.
182 See above at note 3.
183  Id., at para. 184.
184 Based solely of the residence of their parents, certain French-speaking children were refused access 
to French-language schools situated in six localities on the edge of Brussels that were subject to special 
language status. The ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 14 together with Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1: a similar restriction would not have applied to Dutch-speaking children in an analogous 
situation.
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an inferior education with inevitable consequences for their life chances thereafter.185 
However, the claim was not that the regime governing school selection and allocation 
was deliberately discriminatory by requiring separate school arrangements. Rather, it 
occurred indirectly, through the manner in which the legislation was applied. The Grand 
Chamber upheld the applicants’ claim, concluding by a majority of thirteen votes to 
four that there had been a violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with the right to 
education. However, critical to this outcome was the novel and powerful stance that the 
ECtHR adopted in relation to the burden of proof imposed on the Czech authorities and 
the fortuitous use of statistics authored by the Council of Europe bodies and the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.186
 Historically, applicants have encountered what has often been an insuperable diffi culty 
in indirect discrimination cases, namely that the ECtHR has required allegations to be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, in reversing the Chamber judgment,187 the 
Grand Chamber held that if an applicant had established (if necessary by advancing 
statistical evidence) that a practice had a disparate racial impact, then the burden shifted 
to the state to demonstrate a just cause for the difference in treatment. Moreover, with the 
burden of proof placed upon it, the Czech government was unable to persuade the Court 
that there was an objective and reasonable justifi cation for the overtly disadvantageous 
situation. The ECtHR accordingly held by thirteen votes to four that there had been a 
breach of Article 14, taken together with the right to education.
 Thus, encouraged by the Court’s stance in D.H. on statistics and the burden of proof, 
there is room for a degree of optimism that Article 14 may become a more effective 
tool against indirect discrimination in the accessibility of socio-economic entitlements. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how far the Court will go in applying the new tests 
and the range and authority of statistical evidence that will be necessary in cases of 
indirect discrimination.
 At this point, there is nothing to suggest a bolder move by the ECtHR towards the 
use of Article 14, coupled with positive duties in Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, to make social 
provision for disadvantaged individuals and families living at the margins of existence 
without adequate support for their needs.
5 Conclusion
Recent commentaries have focused on the willingness of the ECtHR (irrespective of the 
negative-positive orientation of rights) to examine the scope of state obligations to make 
basic social provisions, under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, in the light of such factors as 
the degree of culpability for socio-economic defi cits and the severity of the destitution 
at issue.188 Nevertheless, we have seen that, despite the well-recognised conceptual 
inadequacy of the positive-negative dichotomy of rights, its pervasive infl uence 
continues to be strongly refl ected in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, especially in socio-
economic complaints concerning access to basic socio-economic provisions. Thus, on 
185 The applicants produced a survey which revealed that in their region 1.8% of non-Roma children were 
placed in special schools, compared to 50.3% of Roma children. D.H. v. the Czech Republic, above note 3, 
at para. 90.
186 This is an important extension of the ECtHR’s willingness to rely on other instruments in its interpretation 
of ECHR rights.
187 Application No. 53725/00, 7 February 2006.
188 See Clements and Simmons, above note 1, at 412-413. In a review of the case law under Articles 3 and 
8 ECHR, the authors have usefully identifi ed a robust set of criteria according to which, in cases of severe 
destitution or socio-economic deprivation that is directly or indirectly attributable to state failure, the Court 
is prepared to examine the state’s responsibility, primarily in terms of its obligations under Articles 3 and 
8 ECHR. The authors identify such cases, such as the Haderini complaint, above note 88, as lying at the 
‘severe end of the scale’ where it was alleged that the state itself was directly culpable for the complainants’ 
homelessness. A second category of cases demonstrates substantial socio-economic disadvantage for which 
the state is only indirectly responsible, for example where legitimate state action has had a disproportionate 
(albeit unintended) consequence on an individual or group. See Buckley v. UK, above note 128 (where a 
regulatory function may give rise to discrimination against particular groups the ECtHR may scrutinise the 
proportionality of the scheme).
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the one hand, the ECtHR has reminded us that the steps needed to discharge a positive 
obligation under Article 3 may be ‘more judgemental’ and more prone to variation from 
state to state than in cases of negative infl iction of harm. On the other hand, we have 
seen that despite the well-recognised potential under Article 8 to protect vulnerable 
individuals even in respect of housing needs (Marzari), strategic case law (Connors 
and McCann v. UK) continues to refl ect a bias towards claims involving negative 
interference with the enjoyment of an existing home. Indeed it is in the vexed area of 
housing needs that we most clearly see that the ECtHR has failed to embrace fully a 
theory of positive obligations, according to which questions of state responsibility are 
examined in the light of the nature and extent of threats to rights and the extent to which 
the state or its agents can be said to be responsible for the defi cit.
 However, we have also recognised that issues of constitutional propriety relating to 
the adjudication of such resource intensive rights are no less problematic in international 
courts than on the domestic plane. On the one hand, therefore, we have accepted the 
diffi culties of determining the proportionality of a state’s failure to provide for the needs 
of vulnerable individuals in the jurisdiction where competition or lack of resources lie at 
the very heart of the complaint. On the other hand, we have argued that a crucial aspect 
of the Court’s constitutional role vis-à-vis that of national authorities is the promotion 
of common values and standards of respect for human dignity and personal integrity in 
a growing family of European democratic states. Thus, we have suggested that recent 
cases, such as N v. UK, which was founded on Article 3, refl ect a welcome development 
in the willingness of the ECtHR to address fundamental questions about the limits of 
state responsibility to make social provision for vulnerable and needy individuals living 
in the jurisdiction. Throughout this article we have argued that the incremental refl exive 
approach of the ECtHR to the development of positive obligations has failed to keep 
step with the emergence of a more principled approach, where positive obligations are 
determined in accordance with universal fundamental standards of dignity, equality and 
personal autonomy inherent in the Convention rights. Moreover, we have also seen 
that limitations in the drafting of Articles 6 and 14 ECHR have similarly triggered an 
expansive approach to the interpretation of the rights. Thus, regrettably, the ECtHR 
has focused more closely on the artifi cial extension of the substantive socio-economic 
rights covered by the Convention than on efforts to address issues of socio-economic 
deprivation more holistically through the development of a substantive model of equality 
or due process in public law disputes. Therefore, despite recent progress towards a more 
substantive concept of equality, limitations in the drafting of Article 6 and 14 have 
inhibited the Convention’s evolution as an instrument for the principled resolution of 
disputes concerning the fair distribution of socio-economic entitlements in member 
states.
